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The Relevance of Fresh Investment to the
Characterization of Corporate
Distributions and Adjustments
GLENN E. COVEN.:.

Introduction
In our commercially complex world, a desired financial result quite
commonly can be achieved through a variety of routes. Too frequently,
the federal income tax consequences of obtaining the result vary considerably depending upon the route chosen, a highly undesirable result.
The imposition of unequal tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers
is unfair. Moreover, the potential for disparate treatment injects economically wasteful tax gamesmanship into relatively routine commercial
activities.
In many instances, inconsistent tax burdens are the unavoidable consequences of the very effort to tax a complex economy. A taxing system,
to be comprehensible, must categorize transactions. A transaction which
by chance or design approaches a prescribed boundary may be taxed very
differently from its mirror image approaching tl1e same boundary from
the other side. Many such anomalies within our taxing system, however,
are entirely avoidable. For reasons of historical accident or excessive
administrative zeal, alternative forms of economically identical transactions simply may have been analyzed differently, their similarities
ignored. 1 The taxing system can be made more rational and simpler by
identifying such anomalies and eliminating them from the law.
* GLENN E. CoVEN (A.B. 1963, Swarthmore; LL.B. 1966, Columbia) is Pr~
fessor of Law, University of Tennessee. The author expresses his appreciation
to his colleague Professor AMY HEss for her helpful criticism of an earlier draft
of this article.
1 The inconsistent tax consequences considered in this article are the product of
faulty judicial and administrative interpretation of broad or ambiguous statutory
language. There are other sources of inconsistent treatment, most notably, express
statutory mandate. Congress may prescribe inconsistent tax treatment for comparable activities either to achieve a nontax objective or by seeming inadvertence.
For an example of the former, compare the favorable consequences of exploiting
patents provided by § 1235 with the consequences of transactions in intellectual
properties governed by§ 1221{3). Inadvertent inconsistencies arise, with increasing frequency, from efforts to correct specific manifestations of broader problems
while leaving the basic problem and its other manifestations untouched. For a
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This article examines a financial transaction that is commonplace in
the life of many corporations: a partial shift of corporate ownership from
an existing stockholder group to new investors that is accompanied by
a withdrawal of investment by one or more members of the old group.
Three of the more common ways of achieving this result are examined
here: the Zenz redemption, a statutory merger or consolidation accompanied by a distribution of boot, and a liquidation-reincorporation. 2 Although not compelled by any provision of the Internal Revenue Code,
the income tax consequences to shareholders receiving corporate distributions incident to such transactions are likely to be very different
depending upon the route chosen. The differing treatments have evolved
because neither the courts nor the Commissioner has given due regard
to the relevance of the fresh investment from the new investor group to
the characterization of the disposition of corporate interests by the old
stockholder group.
This article first demonstrates the proper relevance of fresh investment to the tax consequences of the partially withdrawing stockholder
in the context of a simple redemption. It then shows that consistent
treatment of fresh investment in the three transactional formats both
produces consistent results among comparable transactions, thereby enhancing the rationality of the taxing system, and yields superior results
to the participants in each form of transaction viewed in isolation.

The Problem in General
One of the more fruitful sources of inconsistent tax consequences
under the Internal Revenue Code is the need to distinguish for income
tax purposes the disposition of an interest in property from the exploitation of the interest in an income producing activity. The Code generally assumes a sharp distinction between these categories and imposes
widely differing income tax burdens on financial receipts from the seemingly dichotomous activities. 3 Dispositive transactions are taxed quite
treatment of one such effort, see Coven, Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht,
Section 357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income, 58 OR. L. REV. 61 (1979).
2 There are other techniques for accomplishing such a shift of investment. For
example, the assets of an existing corporation, together with fresh investment, may
be transferred to a new corporation in exchange for stock and, to the withdrawing
stockholders, cash. The consequences of such a transaction are governed by § 351.
For a recent article which applies to § 351 a dispositive transaction analysis similar
to that used here, see Tillinghast and Paully, The Effect of the Collateral Issuance
of Stock or Securities on the "Control" Requirement of Section 351, 37 TAX L.
REV. 251 (1982).
a A few recently enacted provisions of the Code are based on the contrary assumption, namely, that a single transaction may contain elements of both a sale
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lightly. The proceeds of a disposition are taxed only to the extent that
they exceed the taxpayer's remaining investment in the property interest:'
Moreover, the taxable amount is frequently eligible for the highly favorable rate of tax imposed on capital gains. G On the other hand, receipts
from the exploitation of property are fully subject to tax and are taxed
at ordinary income rates. 0
Regrettably, the world that we attempt to tax fails to draw this distinction. Complete dispositions and mere exploitations are at best points on
a continuum of commercial activities. Consequently, the lines drawn in
the various contexts in which this distinction carries controlling significance have not been entirely satisfactory and have produced a disproportionately large amount of controversy. 7
The inherent arbitrariness of the distinction between gain or loss on
a disposition and a return on a retained interest is nowhere more evident
than in the rules that apply the distinction to corporate distributions. 8 A
sale of a portion of a stock interest in a corporation to an unrelated person necessarily produces a pro tanto reduction in the seller's continuing
interest in the corporation and thus is treated as a disposition.° Conversely, a mere pro rata distribution with respect to a retained stock
and an exploitation. For example, § 1253 provides that in the context of what
otherwise constitutes the sale of a franchise or trademark, the receipt of payments
contingent upon productivity or use are denied capital gains treatment. Such
bifurcation of a single transaction, however, remains the rare exception.
4 I.R.C. § 1001.
5 I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 and 1221. In general, gain of a noncorporate taxpayer
on a disposition of property is taxed at a rate equal to 40% of the otherwise
applicable tax rate.
o See I.R.C. § 61.
7 One of the currently more notorious controversies surrounds the distinction
between installment sales and financing leases. Taxpayers and the Service have
quarrelled for decades over whether a manufacturer or financial intermediary has
sold or merely leased property to the user. See, e.g., Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) and Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715,
modified, Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647, Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529,
Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731. Considerable confusion was added to this
branch of the controversy when Congress provided that for the purpose of permitting trafficking in the tax benefits of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System,
transactions that everyone agreed did not constitute leases henceforth would be
regarded as leases. I.R.C. § 168(f) (8).
8 Prophetically, the Supreme Court's first confrontation with the definition of
income for tax purposes arose in the context of a corporate distribution of a stock
dividend which the Court held was not taxable. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920). In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the distribution was the
functional equivalent of a cash dividend and reinvestment and should be taxed
in the same manner.
9 I.R.C. § 1001. Of course, it is always possible to pretend to sell stock, in which
event the purported disposition may be disregarded. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(a) (1)
and 1091.
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interest is usually a return on that stock investment, a dividend. 10 A sale
of stock to the issuing corporation straddles these categories and requires
arbitrary characterization. While other solutions might be possible, 11
the Code recognizes that such a redemption may more nearly resemble
either a disposition or a dividend and thus characterizes a redemption as
a disposition or a dividend, depending on which category the particular
transaction more closely resembles.
For corporate distributions which occur in isolation-for simple redemptions not involving multiple corporations, for example-a reasonable measure of consistency of characterization has been achieved for
the great majority of transactions. Redemptions deemed to be dispositions are distinguished from those that are not under the largely mechanical safe harbor rules of section 302 (b). Since a disposition should result
in a reduction of a taxpayer's continuing ownership interest, while a
dividend typically does not, section 302 provides that a redemption is
taxed as a disposition only if the effect of the redemption is to materially
diminish the redeemed stockholder's continuing interest in the corporation. Section 302(b) (2), for example, specifies that a stockholder's
proportionate interest is regarded as materially reduced if it is less than
80 percent of the proportionate interest held prior to the redemption. 12
10

Section 316{a) defines a dividend as any distribution of property from a
corporation to its stockholders to the extent of the corporation's earnings and
profits. "Earnings and profits" is not comprehensively defined but generally
corresponds to the accounting concept of retained earnings. Under§§ 301 (a) and
(c) (1), to the extent that a corporate distribution is a dividend as so defined, it
is fully taxed at ordinary income rates, unless the distribution is governed by a
more specific section of the Code. Thus, for example, a distribution in the form
of a stock redemption which meets the requirements of § 302(b) is treated as a
sale (I.R.C. § 301 (a)), not as a dividend.
11 For a summary of several possible approaches to changing the present method
of taxing redemptions, see ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 100-29 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1979) (Subchapter C, Corporate Distributions).
1 2 Actually, of course, the requirements of § 302(b) (2) are a bit more complicated:
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.- ...
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTION OF SfOCK.(A) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is
substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) LIMITATION.-This paragraph shall not apply unless immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) DEFINITIONs.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution
is substantially disproportionate if(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of
the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
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While plainly arbitrary, this "substantially disproportionate., test of section 302(b)(2) possesses the twin virtues of relative clarity and simplicity and eliminates much of the confusion that existed under prior
law. 13
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all
of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the
common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting), after
and before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if there is more
than one class of common stock, the determination shall be made by
reference to fair market value.
(D) SERIES OF REDEMPTIONS.-This paragraph shall not apply to
any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect of which
is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution which (in the aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
Moreover, § 302(c) (1) provides that in computing stock ownership, the attribution rules of§ 318(a) are applicable. The complications added by stock attribution are not of present concern.
The application of the substantially disproportionate rule is illustrated as follows.
Assume that individual A owns 40 of the 100 outstanding shares of a. single class
of stock in a corporation and that 10 of those shares are redeemed. A's percentage
interest in the corporation falls from 40% (40/100) to 33% (30/90). Since
33% is more than 80% of 40%, the redemption does not meet the safe harbor
rule of § 302(b) (2). Unless the redemption meets one of the other tests of
§ 302(b), the distribution is taxed as a dividend.
Section 302(b) sets forth three other tests of general application for avoiding
dividend treatment, none of which is of particular interest here. The complete
termination of a stockholder's interest in a corporation avoids dividend treatment
under § 302(b)(3). A redemption of all of a stockholder's shares would always
satisfy the substantially disproportionate test were it not for the stock attribution
rules. The advantage of the complete termination provision is that, subject to
several lengthy and complex rules, the family attribution rules arc waived for the
purpose of determining whether the redemption has completely terminated the
stockholder's interest. I.R.C. § 302(c) (2).
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA], eliminated the rules allowing distributions
in partial liquidation to be taxed as dispositions under § 331 (see § 346(a) before
its amendment by TEFRA), but added a new exception from dividend treatment
in § 302(b)(4) that is designed to continue sales treatment for distributions to
non-corporate stockholders incident to such transactions. TEFRA, § § 222 (c) and
(d). The definition of a partial liquidation, now contained in § 302(e), remains
essentially unchanged and does not normally encompass any of the transactions
considered herein.
Finally, § 302(b)(1) provides a catch-all rule that dividend treatment is not
imposed "if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend." The scope
of this general test is still emerging, although the Supreme Court has required that
the redemption cause a "meaningful reduction" in stock ownership, taking into
account the stock attribution rules. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
13 For brief histories of the confused pre-1954 caselaw, see B. BITTKER &
J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
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Corporate distributions often do not occur in isolation, however, but
are the mere accompaniments of more fundamental adjustments to the
capital structure of the redeeming corporation. The rational application
of the substantially disproportionate test has proven elusive in cases in
which distributions are only parts of larger transactions in which new
investors are introduced. The complicating factor in such a case is that
the fresh investment independently alters the interest in the corporation
of the recipient of the distribution. Surprisingly enough at this date, the
relevance of this independent expansion of the value of the corporation
to the characterization of the concurrent distribution has not been
established.
Consider, for example, a corporation that has a net worth of $1 million
and is equally owned by two unrelated stockholders. Wishing, perhaps,
to retire from the active management of the business and harvest a part
of the gains in their investments, the shareholders have located an individual willing to invest $600,000 in the corporation. As part of the
transaction in which the new investor is brought in, each shareholder
will convert 40 percent of his investment to cash, leaving each with 25
percent and the new investor with 50 percent of the corporation's stock.
The most expeditious manner in which such a substitution of investment
could occur would be a sale of 40 percent of the outstanding stock of the
corporation directly from the old stockholders to the new for $400,000,
accompanied by the latter's investment of $200,000 in the corporation.
In a no tax world, or perhaps even in a world free of the corporate income tax, the parties typically would not seek a more complex solution
to their desired objective. In our world, however, very substantial income
tax advantages can accrue to both buyer and seller if they choose to deal,
not with each other, but rather with the corporation. 14 Thus, the parties
likely will prefer to cause the corporation to redeem the holdings to be
liquidated while the new investor acquires only newly issued stock. If
1i1i 9.01-.03 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EusTICE]; Dean, Redemptions: Dividend or Capital Gain; Death Taxes, Related Corporations, 13
N.Y.U. lNST. ON FED. TAX'N 547 (1955).
1 4 On direct sale of stock, the seller is taxed, normally at capital gains rates, on
his gain in the particular shares sold. The sale has no effect at the corporate level.
A redemption given sale treatment produces precisely the same tax to the seller.
However, the redemption accomplishes a distribution of earnings and profits. See
I.R.C. § 312(3); Rev. Rul. 79-376, 1979-C.B. 133. This reduction in earnings and profits may benefit all continuing stockholders, most prominently by reducing the amount of any subsequent distributions that may be taxed as dividends.
Perhaps most importantly, to the extent of the redemption, the buyers arc in effect
acquiring an interest in the corporation through the use of the assets of the corporation, but the buyers are not taxed on the value of the assets so used for their
benefit. See Edenfield v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Rev. Rul. 69-608,
1969-2 C.B. 42.
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each stockholder liquidates a portion of his investment through a distribution from the corporation, it becomes necessary to characterize the redemption under section 302(b) (2) as either a disposition of this portion
or as a return on a continued investment, the equivalent of a dividend.
For the purpose of making this determination, the Commissioner appears to be prepared to concede that the change in proportionate interest
of each withdrawing shareholder should be calculated by comparing (a)
his interest in the corporation prior to the purported redemptions and
the issuance of stock to the new investor with (b) the interest held following these transactions. That is, the redemptions and the corporate
sale will be integrated and effect will be given to the reduction in ownership attributable to these transactions. Accordingly, the interest of each
shareholder will be regarded as declining from 50 to 25 percent. Since
this reduction in interest substantially exceeds the 20 percentage points
required by the safe harbor rule of section 302(b) (2), tG the redemption
will be treated as a sale subject to capital gains taxation.
If the new investor is another corporation, the fresh investment could
be obtained through some form of corporate combination, for example,
a statutory merger or consolidation accompanied by distributions to the
old stockholders. Assume the new investor is a corporation that has
assets worth $600,000 and no liabilities. The new investor and the
corporation discussed earlier might consolidate into a new corporation,
C, under a plan providing for (a) the exchange of all stock of the new
investor for 50 percent of the shares of C and (b) the exchange by each
of the old shareholders of his stock for 25 percent of the C stock and
$200,000 in cash.
In this case, the Commissioner, with some backing from the courts,
would take the position that the withdrawal of funds and consolidation
cannot be integrated and that the change in ownership attributable to
the consolidation must be disregarded in testing for dividend equivalence.
Under this view, the proportionate interest of each old stockholder is
deemed not to change at all, and the case is analyzed as though each of
them owned 50 percent of a $1 million corporation before the transaction
and afterwards owns 50 percent of a $600,000 corporation. The mechanical test of section 302(b) (2) is not met, according to the Service, and, apparently, the distribution is taxed in a manner similar to the
taxation of an ordinary dividend. 16 Thus, notwithstanding that the re15 The reduction also meets the further requirement that the redeemed shareholder own less than 50 percent of the voting stock immediately after the redemption. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B).
16 The taxation of distributions incident to reorganizations, or "boot," is governed by § 356. In testing for dividend equivalent under that section, however,
the rules of § 302 are applied by analogy. See infra text accompanying notes

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

426

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:

organization leaves the shareholder in precisely the same economic position as the redemption assumed earlier, the consequences to him will be
quite different. While capital gains treatment is relatively easy to obtain
under the rules the Commissioner applies to a simple redemption, it is
virtually impossible to obtain under the rules applied to an analogous
reorganization.
As a third alternative, the stockholders could cause their corporation
to be completely liquidated, each receiving assets worth $500,000 in the
liquidation, retaining $200,000 of the distributed assets, and contributing
$300,000 of the assets to a new corporation in exchange for 25 percent
of its stock. If as a part of the same transaction the new investor contributes $600,000 to the new corporation in exchange for 50 percent of
its stock, the parties will be left in the same positions that they would
have occupied under the two forms of this transaction considered
previously.
Whether the corporate assets retained by the shareholders in the liquidation-reincorporation will be treated as the equivalent of a dividend
again depends on the effect given to the fresh investment. The Commissioner has argued that the fresh investment should not be integrated
to any extent with the reincorporation and distribution and that each
stockholder should be taxed as if he had received a distribution in the
nature of a dividend from a continuing corporation. The courts, however, have not only integrated the transactions but have held that the
presence of fresh investment requires that the shareholder be treated as
having disposed of his prior investment, thus entitling him to capital gains
taxation.
Given the identity of financial result to the shareholder in each of these
three forms of transactions, it would plainly be desirable for the federal
income tax consequences of the partial withdrawal of investment to be as
identical as the Code permits. An analysis of the proper significance of
fresh investment to the characterization of the distribution to the shareholder in each of these contexts indicates that none of the results presently
obtained in these transactions is correct. In each, the fresh investment
should be integrated with the withdrawal, but it is relevant to the characterization of the withdrawal only to the extent the fresh investment is
the functional equivalent of a disposition. As will be demonstrated, to
the extent that the fresh investment exceeds the distribution to the old
shareholder, the fresh investment is not relevant to either the character38-40. If reorganization boot is found to have the effect of a dividend, it is usually
taxed in the same manner as an ordinary dividend. One significant difference is
that the amount of boot subject to tax cannot exceed the stockholder's gain on the
reorganization exchange. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). That limitation is rarely of significance in the transactions considered herein.
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ization of the distribution or the finding of a reorganization. Accordingly, whether the fresh investment comes as a direct investment in the
existing corporation or by virtue of a statutory merger or consolidation,
the interest of each old shareholder should be regarded as declining from
50 to 30 percent.
In the liquidation-reincorporation form of the transaction, the distribution to be characterized is the distribution in liquidation. It should be
integrated with the subsequent reincorporation in determining whether
the overall transaction constitutes a reorganization. In making this determination, the fresh investment is not relevant to the application of the
traditional continuity of interest test applied to all reorganizations. 17 On
the facts supposed, since each shareholder retains 60 percent of his prior
investment as a continuing equity interest, the continuity of interest test is
met. Accordingly, the transaction should be treated as an F reorganization. Thus, the $200,000 retained by each old stockholder would be
treated as a distribution of boot incident to a reorganization or as a redemption accompanying the reorganization, 18 and the shareholder should
be taxed precisely as he was taxed in the other versions of the transaction.

The Zenz Redemption
The simplest situation in which a corporate distribution occurs in
tandem with a fresh investment is a redemption coupled with a purchase
of stock by the new investor from the old shareholder or the corporation.
The 1954 ,Pecision of the Sixth Circuit in Zenz v. Quin/i'•,•an 10 is the
starting point for the analysis here. Mrs. Zenz had inherited from her
husband all outstanding shares of a corporation which had accumulated
a substantial and perhaps excessive portion of its earnings. Mrs. Zenz
wished to dispose completely of the corporation. She sold somewhat less
than one half of her shares. Three weeks later the corporation redeemed
the balance of her stock for an amount that approximated its earned
surplus. The Commissioner evidently argued that the redemption must
be characterized separately from the sale of stock and that because the
effect of the postsale redemption was the same as if the redemption had
preceded the sale, it should be subject to tax in the same manner. 20
1 7 See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
18 Whether distributions accompanying an F

reorganization constitute reorganization boot or are to be taxed separately under §§ 301 and 302 remains in dispute.
See infra text accompanying note 129.
19 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
2 0 The position of the Commissioner is not described with particular clarity by
either the court of appeals or the district court, whose opinion appears at 106 F.
Supp. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1952). It does appear that the Commissioner relied in part
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Since a presale redemption would not have altered the proportionate
interest of a sole stockholder such as Mrs. Zenz, the Commissioner concluded that the redemption was essentially the equivalent of a dividend.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that a redemption that in fact completely terminated a stockholder's interest in a corporation could never
be the equivalent of a dividend and thus sustained Mrs. Zenz's treatment
of the sale and redemption as dispositions entitled to sales treatment.
The court could have reached this result by agreeing that the redemption was a transaction to be tested separately from the stock sale but rejecting the Commissioner's rather strained reconstruction of the order of
events. It is not entirely certain that the court intended to go any further
than that. Nor at the time was the Commissioner prepared to read the
Zenz opinion expansively. While he almost immediately announced his
agreement with the decision, the retreat was limited to the particular facts
of the case. 21 Nevertheless, the opinion suggested that under a step transaction analysis, the court had viewed the sale and redemption as a single,
integrated transaction in determining whether the change in the stockholder's interest in the corporation was sufficient to avoid dividend
equivalence. 22
Whether intended in 1954 or not, the decision in Zenz v. Quinlivan
has, by a series of incremental expansions of its reach, come to stand for
the broader proposition. Just. seven years later, the Eighth Circuit was
presented in United States v. Carey 2 a with a similar transaction in which
the parties had somewhat cavalierly reversed the order of events. Two
equal stockholders caused their corporation to make a pro rata redemption of approximately one half of the stock of each, whereupon one of
the stockholders sold his remaining shares to the other and a new investor. In the district court, the government sought to charge both stockholders with dividend income, but both taxpayers prevailed. The government appealed only with respect to the stockholder who retained an
interest in the corporation. It did not appeal the decision in favor of the
upon the dearth of prior dividend distributions and the resulting accumulation of
earnings in arguing that the transaction amounted to a circuitous attempt to distribute earnings in a manner essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id. at 61. However, in Revenue Ruling 77-226, 1977-2 C.B. 90, the Commissioner described the
government's position in Zenz as set forth in the text.
21 Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 C.B. 167. The "particular" facts stressed by the
Commissioner were the sale preceding the redemption and the complete termination of interest. In the following year, the Commissioner extended his concurrence to cases arising under the 1954 Code. Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223.
22 At several points in the appellate opinion, the court variously appears to
address the separate redemption or the overall transaction as accomplishing the
complete termination of Mrs. Zenz's interest.
23 298 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
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terminated stockholder for the stated reason that his "interest in the corporation was terminated as a result of the transaction in question." :H
Following this concession, the Zenz doctrine has been extended to
stand for the proposition that if a shareholder disposes of an interest in
a corporation in two factually related steps, one being a sale and the other
a redemption, those steps are integrated in applying section 302. Further, if as a result of this integrated transaction the stockholder is left
owning no stock in the corporation, the transaction is a complete termination of interest under section 302 (b) (3). As so extended, the doctrine
is unquestionably proper.
While this extension of the Zenz doctrine is not controversial, it is
necessary, in order to appreciate the proper scope of the doctrine and its
application to the transactions that are the subject of this article, to understand why the results obtained through its application are correct.
Two quite separate legal issues must be addressed in the application
of the Zenz doctrine, or indeed any other manifestation of the step transaction analysis. The first concerns the level of factual relationship among
the discrete steps that must exist before these steps will be regarded as
components of an integrated whole in applying section 302. The requisite level has not been defined consistently. 2 ~ In some instances, the
courts have required an artificially strong relationship, such as a binding
contract, before applying the step transaction doctrine, 26 while in other
cases a surprisingly weak relationship has sufficed. 27 Generalization is
thus hazardous at best, but most cases disclose a pragmatic, common
sense approach. Where the steps are necessary to achieve the result
sought by the parties, have been arranged in advance, and are executed
during a relatively brief period of time in conformity to the original plan,
24

Id. at 532 n.2. The enduring importance of Carey is attributable to this
concession, although the court's disposition of the case before it is also of interest.
If the redemption were not a dividend to the terminated stockholder, the court
reasoned, the identical redemption could not be a dividend to the continuing
stockholder. It held that the taxpayer before it was entitled to sales treatment.
Since the interest of the continuing stockholder actually increased as a result of
the overall transaction, this decision is obviously wrong and may in part have been
responsible for the reluctance of the Commissioner to extend the Zenz doctrine to
partial redemptions.
2 5 Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
2s E.g., Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968); American Bantam Car
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), afj'd per curiam 177 F.2d 513 (3d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
27 E.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. CJ. 1969)
(transfer of stock in target for cash and stock of acquiring corporation followed
by merger of target into its new parent; held, steps collapsed and initial exchange
treated as part of reorganization although old stockholders of target did not participate in merger and may not have been aware that it occurred).
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the step transaction doctrine is almost uniformly applied. 28 When these
tests are met, the discrete steps taken by the parties are in fact components of a single, continuing transaction. Thus, it is not only appropriate
but logically necessary to integrate those steps and to analyze their income tax consequences in that light. The facts of Zenz v. Quinlivan
itself, and of most cases in which the parties have sought the same result,
clearly meet this standard for integration.
The second question is whether the change in stock ownership produced by the sale affects the characterization of the redemption. It does
not necessarily follow from the decision to integrate that the sales component of the transaction is relevant to the characterization of the redemption. 29 The relevance of one step in a transaction to another is a
question of law which, in this context, must be resolved by reference to
the policy embodied in the substantially disproportionate test of section
302(b) (2), a mechanical test designed to evaluate the extent to which
a redemption resembles a sale of stock to a new investor. The plain
focus of the substantially disproportionate test is upon the reduction in
the redeemed shareholder's ownership, not upon whatever correlative
increase in interest may be obtained by others. It is not material whether
the increase in ownership is obtained by one who previously owned stock
in the corporation (as in a simple redemption) or by a new investor (as
in a redemption coupled with a sale). An ownership shift produced by
contemporaneous sales of stock thus has the same relevance to the characterization of the redemption as the shift resulting from the redemption
alone. Accordingly, the Zenz integration doctrine is the correct method
of analyzing redemptions that are factually integrated with sales.
A crucial distinction that will shortly be developed must, however, be
observed. While all of the redeemed stockholder's transfers are relevant
to the computation of the change in proportionate interest, not all
28

For a typical example, see West Coast Marketing Corp. v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 32 (1966). See generally BITIKER & EusTICE, supra note 13, at~ 14.51.
29 For example, a B reorganization is an acquisition of stock in the target corporation in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. If,
incident to such a reorganization, debt of the target is acquired for debt of the
acquiring corporation, the debt for debt exchange does not destroy the reorganization merely because the exchange goes beyond the transaction described in
§ 368(a)(1)(B). Rather, the exchange is irrelevant to the reorganization and
therefore is taxed separately. Rev. Rul. 69-142, 1969-1 C.B, 107. C/. Rev. Rul.
70-269, 1970-1 C.B. 82 (stock options).
This distinction between relevance and factual integration has recently been
developed in Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction
Doctrine, 60 TAXES 970 (1982). The authors observe that in step transaction
litigation, the results reached are determined both· by factual integration and by
"policy and Code structure." That is, the issue depends on whether the integrated
step is relevant to the policy of the substantive Code provision in question.
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changes in proportionate interest are relevant to the characterization of
a corporate distribution. This limitation of the legitimate scope of the
Zenz doctrine does not appear to have been observed when the doctrine
was extended to substantially disproportionate redemptions.
While the Zenz integration doctrine rapidly became established in the
jurisprudence of section 302(b)(3), it remained unclear for over 20
years whether or to what extent sales would be integrated with redemptions under section 302(b) (2) if a redeemed stockholder retained an
interest in the corporation.30 The logic of the doctrine applies to this
case, however, and it was so applied in Revenue Ruling 75-447.31 Zenz
was there characterized as holding that if a sale and redemption occur as
parts of a single transaction, both steps must be integrated for the purpose of testing for dividend equivalence. The order of events, the ruling
says, is irrelevant. Thus, the ruling concludes, for the purposes of the
substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b)(2), the stockholders' interests in the corporation prior to the redemption or sale are
to be compared with their holdings following both steps in the transaction.
The ruling gives an example: A corporation having 100 shares of
stock outstanding was owned by two equal stockholders. Each stockholder sold 15 of his 50 shares to a new investor and caused the corporation to redeem five of his shares. The ruling held that the change in
proportionate interest of each of the old stockholders was to be measured
by comparing his initial holding of 50/100 with his ultimate holding of
30/90. Since 33 percent is less than 80 percent of 50 percent, the safe
harbor test of section 302(b) (2) is satisfied and both of the old stockholders are entitled to capital gains taxation with respect to both the sale
and the redemption.
The ruling also addressed another variation that had not previously
been the subject of either a ruling or court decision. The desired shift in
corporate ownership could be accomplished without any direct sales of
stock at the shareholder level. Instead, the old and the new stockholder
groups might deal exclusively with the corporation, the old stockholders
having a greater amount of their stock redeemed and the new investor
acquiring stock by an original issue from the corporation. In the example in the ruling, each of the old stockholders could have caused the
corporation to redeem 20 shares of his stock, and the new investor could
have purchased 30 shares from the corporation. The ruling treated these
alternative forms of accomplishing a shift of investment identically.
Under the again expanded Zenz doctrine, therefore, a redemption is inFriend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965).
1975-2 C.B. 113.

3° See
31
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tegrated with a sale of stock at the corporate level, and the change in
proportionate ownership is measured on the completion of both steps in
the transaction.
The extension of the Zenz doctrine to the integration of corporate
level sales is also correct. The corporate sale variation is merely an indirect method of achieving precisely the same result as previously was
obtained by a direct stockholder sale. Since the two variants are functional equivalents, they should bear the same income tax burden. That
the new and old groups do not deal directly with each other is irrelevant.
If the corporate sale were not integrated with the redemption, the old
stockholders would be regarded as not reducing their interests at all-a
plainly unrealistic conclusion. Indeed, the redemption of 40 shares of
stock is somewhat illusory since the new investor, by prearrangement,
replenishes the value of the corporation to the extent of his new investment. If, for analytical purposes, this transitory flow of value were
washed out, the transaction might be reconstructed as a redemption of
ten shares of stock from the old stockholders and a direct sale of 30
shares from them to the new investor-the very transaction considered
first. 32 Thus, Revenue Ruling 75-447 is correct in concluding that to
the extent fresh investment constitutes the functional equivalent of a
direct stockholder sale of stock, the change in proportionate ownership
it produces is entirely relevant to the characterization of the accompanying redemption.
The integration of corporate sales with redemptions, however, creates
a factual possibility that is not present when the sales are made by stockholders. When stock sales are made by a corporation rather than its old
stockholders, more shares can be issued than are redeemed and the corporate entity may expand rather than contract as a result of the combined
transactions. The new investor, for example, might wish to acquire, not
33 percent of the corporation, but 50 percent and accordingly might invest a greater amount in exchange for 60 shares of stock. After the redemption of 40 shares from the two old stockholders, the corporation
would have 120 shares outstanding. 33 Such an expansion could not occur
32

It is not suggested here that redemptions and corporate sales should generally
be reconstructed as shareholder level sales. Rather, the suggestion is merely that
since the resulting proportionate change in ownership is identical regardless of
which format is employed, the characterizations of the distributions should also
be identical. On appropriate facts, however, such a reconstruction would be warranted. See, e.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See also
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 939 ( 1971).
33 For the sake of simplicity, in this and subsequent illustrations it is assumed
that the value of a share of stock in the corporation remains unchanged and, when
two corporations are involved, and that their shares are of equal value. A contrary
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if only stock previously outstanding in the hands of the old stockholders
had been sold.
If Revenue Ruling 75-447 were applied literally to a redemption accompanied by such a corporate sale, a plainly erroneous result would
obtain. In the example, each of the old stockholders would be regarded
as having reduced his proportionate interest in the corporation from
50/100 or 50 percent to 30/120 or 25 percent, a reduction of 50 percent, when in fact he liquidated only 40 percent of his prior investment,
20 shares out of 50. Effect would be given not only to new investment
that replaced the value distributed in the redemption but also to the further fresh investment that expanded the size of the corporation. Yet, to
the extent of this expansion, the resulting shift in proportionate ownership does not reflect a disposition and thus should not be relevant to the
characterization of the redemption.
While it is unquestionably correct as a factual matter to integrate redemptions with sales, whether by the redeemed stockholder or by the
corporation, a blind application of the Zenz integration doctrine and the
mechanical formula of section 302(b)(2) cannot be permitted to obscure the central issue that these rules address. Section 302(b) is designed to measure the extent to which a liquidation of investment by
means of a redemption resembles a sale. In testing for that similarity,
the formula contained in section 302(b) (2) refers to the stockholder's
proportionate interest immediately after the redemption because, in the
simple redemption the formula was designed to address, that resulting
proportionate interest accurately reflects the extent to which the redemption shifted ownership of the corporation to another. The shareholder's
resulting proportionate interest is the appropriate measure of the change
in proportionate interest in the case of a simple redemption, not accompanied by any fresh investment, because that resulting interest is solely
produced by the redemption.
Section 302 was not drafted, however, to measure sale resemblance in
a transaction accompanied by fresh investment. In extending the scope
of section 302 to encompass such a shift in investment, the formula of
section 302(b) (2) must be applied consistently with its purpose of measuring the degree of similarity between the transaction in question and
a sale. If a redemption is accompanied by fresh investment made directly in the corporation, but a corporate contraction nevertheless results
because the redemption distribution exceeds the new investment, the net
effect of the transaction is identical to a sale of stock directly from the
old stockholder to the new investor accompanied by a redemption. Both
assumption would affect only the complexity of the illustration, not the principle
illustrated.
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the redemption and the constructive sale reduce the shareholder's investment. The stockholder's final proportionate interest is solely a product
of his dispositions, as in a simple redemption, and thus can properly be
used in determining whether the change in proportionate interest by
virtue of the aggregate of these dispositions is sufficient to cause the redemption to be treated as a sale.
On the other hand, the mere receipt by a corporation of fresh investment, not accompanied by a redemption, is not a disposition by the existing shareholders. The existing shareholders have not thereby reduced
their investments and indeed under our system of taxation have not participated in a transaction regarded as a taxable event. 34 The decline in
the proportionate interests of the existing shareholders caused solely by
such a fresh investment does not at all resemble a sale of stock at the
shareholder level, and is of a very different character than the declines
in interest that section 302(b) (2) was designed to measure.
If a redemption is accompanied by fresh investment which results in
an expansion of the corporate entity, the effect of the combined transaction is the same as a sale of stock at the shareholder level plus a further fresh investment. To the extent that the fresh investment does not
exceed the redemption distribution, the investment reflects a disposition
of stock by the existing shareholder and is relevant to the characterization
of redemption. On the other hand, to the extent that the fresh investment
exceeds the redemption distribution, it does not reflect a disposition by
the existing shareholder and is entirely irrelevant to the characterization
of the contemporaneous redemption. Since the reduction in proportionate ownership produced by a corporate expansion is not relevant to the
comparison section 302(b) (2) was designed to make, the change in proportionate ownership attributable to the expansion must be excluded from
the computation.
It follows that in computing the interests of the redeemed stockholders
after the transaction, the continuing stock interest must be measured with
respect to an amount no greater than the value of their old investment.
If the value of each share is not independently altered in the transaction,
the denominator of the "after" fraction used under section 302 (b) ( 2)
34

The law could be otherwise. Fresh investment in a corporation could be
reconstructed as a sale by each of the old stockholders of a portion of his stock
to the new investor followed by a contribution of the proceeds of the sale to the
corporation. Such a characterization would merely accelerate the tax on the old
stockholders' unrealized appreciation. The acceleration does not seem justified,
however, since no value has been removed from corporate solution. The only
effect of the transaction upon the old stockholders is that their stock in the corporation now represents an interest in an altered mix of assets-a circumstance
that could result from corporate action not involving new investment which would
clearly not amount to a disposition by the old stockholders.
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cannot exceed the number of shares outstanding before the transaction.
In the example, notwithstanding that the new investment increased the
total shares outstanding from 100 before to 120 after the transaction, the
continUing interest of each of the old stockholders in his prior investment
is 30/100, not 30/120. Accordingly, the proportionate interests of each
of the old stockholders should be regarded as declining from 50/100, or
50 percent, to 30/100, or 30 percent. So treating the old stockholders as
disposing of 40 percent of their investments accurately reflects the extent
to which they have transferred an interest in their old investments to the
new investors by the redemption and corporate sale of stock. The additional investment by the new investor in exchange for 20 shares of stock
is simply irrelevant to this measurement. Neither is it relevant that the
retained 60 percent of the old investment is now represented by a 50
percent interest in a somewhat expanded corporation. If the old stockholders were treated as retaining 30/120, or 25 percent, of their investment, they would be regarded as having disposed of 50 percent of their
investment, which they did not do. Taking the fresh investment into
account would overstate the extent of the reduction in interest and erroneously extend sales treatment to distributions that did not entail a sufficiently material shift in interest to be entitled to such treatment.
Moreover, whether a redemption has produced a sufficiently material
shift in the ownership of the corporation to be entitled to sales treatment
should not be affected by the extent to which the value of the corporation expands by virtue of fresh investment. Since that investment is
irrelevant to the characterization of the redemption, its effect should be
neutral. If one of the old stockholders causes 10 of his 50 shares to be
redeemed, for example, the redemption should be regarded as reducing
his continuing interest in the corporation by no more than 20 percent,
an amount insufficient to meet the substantially disproportionate text, regardless of the number of shares of stock of the corporation outstanding
after the transaction. Exactly that neutrality would be achieved by modifying Revenue Ruling 75-447 to address only the continued proportionate interest in the prior investment. Under a literal application of the
ruling, the decline in interest would be a function of the level of new
investment and could produce a computed decline vastly in excess of 20
percent. If the fresh investment caused the number of outstanding shares
to increase to 1,000, for example, the redeeming stockholder would be
regarded as reducing his investment to 40/1000 or four percent, areduction of 92 percent and a totally unrealistic result. Indeed, if full
effect were given to fresh investment, it would produce the absurd result
of converting the most trivial, pro rata redemption of stock from the old
stockholders into a disposition entitled to sales treatment if the redemp-
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tion were accompanied by a significant offering of stock by the corporation.35 It seems most unlikely that such a moratorium on the general
rule of section 302 was intended by Congress, the court in Zenz v. Quinlivan, or by the draftsmen of Revenue Ruling 75-447.
Most Zenz transactions do not result in corporate expansions. Quite
the contrary, a common objective in combining sales and redemptions is
the reduction in the value of the corporation to enable employees or
children to acquire greater interests than would otherwise be possible. In
addition, these transactions are commonly used to withdraw unneeded
liquid assets from corporate solution at capital gains tax rates. Although
the Commissioner has issued several private rulings applying Revenue
Ruling 75-447 favorably to taxpayers, none has been discovered in which
the value of the corporation increased in the transaction. 36
It is probable that in issuing Revenue Ruling 75-447, the Commissioner did not appreciate this difference between stockholder level and
corporate level sales of stock or the implications of fully integrating the
latter under the Zenz doctrine. The possibility of a corporate expansion
was not mentioned in the ruling. Accordingly, it seems that the moratorium on dividend treatment that the ruling appears to sanction was
inadvertent and not intended by the Commissioner. The ruling should
not be applied literally in the event of a corporate expansion and should
be modified to remove any contrary implication.
The observations thus far with respect to the relevance of fresh investment to the characterization of redemption distributions can be summarized as follows: It is proper, actually logically unavoidable, to integrate redemptions with new investment, whether the new investment
occurs by way of a direct sale of stock by a shareholder or a corporate
sale. Notwithstanding that integration, fresh investment, to the extent
that it increases the value of the corporation, is irrelevant to the characterization of the redemption. Accordingly, in measuring the amount
of stock outstanding after the transaction, the amount taken into account
should not exceed the lesser of the actual amount outstanding or the
amount outstanding prior to the transaction.

3:> This consequence of Revenue Ruling 75-447 was noted by the American
Law Institute, seemingly with disapproval. ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT
106 (Tent. Draft No.2, 1979) (Subchapter C, Corporate Distributions).
36 For shareholder sales, see, e.g., LTR 8217138 (Jan. 28, 1982); LTR 8113098
(Dec. 31, 1980); and LTR 8030120 (May 1, 1980). For corporate sales, see
LTR 8130066 (April29, 1981). For gifts integrated with a redemption, see LTR
8012085 (Dec. 28, 1979). See also LTR 8040114 (July 15, 1980) (integration
used to sustain sales treatment under section 302(b)(l) when substantially disproportionate test not met).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1983]

FRESH INVESTMENT

437

Reorganization Boot
If a corporation obtains fresh investment from another corporation
and the transaction takes the form of a merger or consolidation of the
two corporations,37 the old stockholders of the former emerge from the
transaction, as in the transactions considered before, with a continuing
interest in their previously owned assets which are now commingled with
the fresh investment, the assets of the acquiring corporation. Also as
before, the old stockholders may choose the occasion of the merger or
consolidation to reduce their investments by obtaining distributions of
cash or property other than stock or securities in the resulting corporation. If such a distribution of cash or property-"boot" in the parlance
of the tax specialist-occurs, it must be characterized as either the equivalent of a dividend or as a disposition entitling the stockholder to sales
treatment. As in the case of the Zenz redemption, the crucial questions
are whether and to what extent the reduction of the old stockholders'
interests by virtue of the fresh investment affects the characterization of
the distribution.
Concededly, the nature of the broader transaction in which the fresh
investment is obtained is quite different in a reorganization from the
transactions previously considered. As a result, the consequences to the
other parties to the transaction and, indeed, to a withdrawing shareholder to the extent of his remaining investment, are quite different.
Nevertheless, the boot and redemption distributions are identical in their
effects on the old stockholder: In both cases, a partial disinvestment
accompanies a retained interest in an altered mLx of assets. It would
therefore be desirable for the analysis of the characterization of the boot
distribution to proceed along the same lines as the analysis of the partial
Zenz redemption. That result, however, has not been achieved.
Unfortunately, the legal issue begins somewhat differently. If the
stockholders in question were stockholders in the target corporation
which disappeared in the merger, the characterization of the distribution
to them is governed not by section 302 but by section 356(a) (2). The
latter provision lacks the safe harbor rules of section 302 and merely
provides that the distribution is taxed as a dividend if it has the effect of
a dividend.
Until relatively recently, the Commissioner generally argued that any
boot distribution in a reorganization had the effect of a dividend to the
37 Of the three forms of acquisitive reorganizations authorized by § 368(a) (1),
only the A reorganization, a statutory merger or consolidation, liberally permits the
use of boot. Accordingly, the discussion in the text is limited to reorganizations
qualifying under§ 368(a)(l)(A).
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extent of the earnings and profits of the acquired corporation. 38 While
this so-called automatic dividend rule was applied, the question of integration was simply irrelevant. However, the authority of the automatic
dividend position weakened by the early 1970's, and the attention of the
courts and the Commissioner then turned to the development of more
discriminating tests for dividend equivalence. 30 The obvious analogy
was the rules that had evolved under section 302, and when the Commissioner confirmed the demise of the automatic approach, he agreed
that the tests of that section, including the substantially disproportionate
rule of section 302(b)(2), might serve as guidelines in the application
of the boot characterization rule of section 356(a) (2). 40 While the
Commissioner did not say so at the time, the tests of section 302 so
adopted did not include the Zenz integration doctrine.
The JRelevance of Fresh

Investmen~

In contrast to the usual Zenz-type redemption, a merger or other reorganization almost always results in an expansion of the resulting corporate entity. Thus the application of the Zenz integration doctrine along
the lines indicated in Revenue Ruling 7 5-447 would, in nearly every
case, produce the inappropriate results described above.
Indeed, the Commissioner was already painfully aware of the dangers
of an integrated transaction approach to the characterization of boot.
In McDonald v. Commissioner, 41 the taxpayer, as part of a plan for the
acquisition of a corporation in which he was the majority stockholder,
caused the corporation to redeem a portion of his stock for cash. Imme38 This automatic dividend rule is generally attributed to the opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). See Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REv. 573 ( 1965); Darrell,
The Scope of Commissioner v . .Bedford's Estate, 24 TAXES 266 (1946).
30 See Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Rule: Bedford Revisited,
11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841 (1970). The automatic rule was first undermined
in a case in which the Commissioner, seeking to resist dividend treatment, argued
that the court should not automatically characterize boot as a dividend. Idaho
Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
832 (1958). The cases decided during the 15 years following Idaho Power
analyzed boot in a manner resembling the inquiry under § 302, but apparently
no consideration was given to the change in ownership produced by the reorganization itself. See, e.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
4 0 Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
Collectively, these rulings indicated that the Service would apply the meaningful
reduction test developed in Davis v. United States, 397 U.S. 301 ( 1970), under
the dividend equivalence rule of § 302{b){l). In addition, Revenue Ruling
74-516 computed the reduction in interest using the substantially disproportionate
formula of§ 302(b)(2).
4152 T.C. 82 (1969).
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diately thereafter, the taxpayer transferred all of his remaining interest
in the corporation to the acquiring corporation in a transaction that all
parties conceded was a valid reorganization within the definition of section 368(a) (1) (B). 42 Since a B reorganization cannot be accompanied
by a boot distribution, the Tax Court was forced to treat the distribution
as a redemption controlled by section 302 and Zenz rather than as boot
governed by section 356. In applying these tests to the redemption, the
court integrated the redemption and the reorganization and thus viewed
the interest of the taxpayer as declining from over 90 percent before the
transaction to an insignificant percentage of the stock of the acquiring
corporation after the transaction. Were a similar analysis to be applied
to the characterization of boot under section 356, virtually all boot distributions would be regarded as not having the effect of a dividend.
Since the Zenz integration rule appeared to produce the wrong result,
the Commissioner opted for its opposite in Revenue Ruling 75-83." 3
Without reference to either Zenz v. Quinlivan or McDonald v. Commissioner, the ruling concluded that boot received by a stockholder of a
target corporation would be treated as if it were distributed in a transaction separate from the reorganization occurring prior to the reorganization.H As a result, a pro rata distribution of boot would not be regarded as diminishing the continuing interest of the old stockholders to
any degree and thus would always be treated as having the effect of a
dividend.
Revenue Ruling 75-83 thus began the cycle anew for its analysis is
identical to the litigating position asserted by the government in Zenz v.
Quinlivan over twenty years before. There too, the government contended that the corporate distribution and the new investment should
be treated separately and as if the redemption had occurred first. As in
the context of a Zenz redemption, treating the distribution of boot as
separate from the blending of investment that occurs in the merger itself
is absolutely untenable. 45 Indeed, if different at all, a boot distribution
42

In Revenue Ruling 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110, the Commissioner withdrew
that concession. Asserting that the Tax Court was correct in viewing the redemption and the later reorganization as a single transaction, the ruling characterized the
purported redemption as a boot distribution. Since boot is not permitted in a B
reorganization, the ruling concluded that the transaction was not a tax-free reorganization.
43 1975-1 C.B. 112.
44 Although Revenue Ruling 75-83 clearly adopts a separate and before analysis,
it states no reasons for that conclusion and in fact does not even acknowledge
that the conclusion requires the application of a separate transaction analysis.
45 The separate transaction analysis of boot in a reorganization is also inconsistent with the analysis of the reorganization itself that is employed by the Commissioner. A nonstatutory prerequisite for reorganization treatment is that the
stockholders of the target corporation maintain a continuity of interest in the
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is usually more firmly prearranged and more clearly integral to a reorganization than is a redemption which may merely set the stage for a sale
of stock. The reduction in proportionate interest suffered by the stockholders of the target corporation as a result of their receipt of boot and
the reduction attributable to the new investment obtained in the merger
are clearly integrated steps in a single transaction and cannot properly
be analyzed otherwise.
Not only are boot distributions and Zenz redemptions both steps in
integrated transactions, but their characterization also presents the same
ultimate issue. Either corporate distribution is entitled to sales rather
than dividend treatment if its effect is to shift materially the ownership
of the corporation to other stockholders. That much the Service seems to
have conceded when it acknowledged that the principles of section 302
were applicable to boot characterization issues arising under section 356.
In analyzing the Zenz redemption, it was observed that a reduction in
corporate ownership resulting from a shift to new investors who had dealt
solely with the corporation was entirely relevant to the characterization
of corporate distributions. The character of that reduction is unaffected
by whether the new investment is attributable to the purchase of stock
from the corporation or a corporate combination. In either case, the old
stockholders' proportionate interests in the continuing corporate entity
have been reduced to the same extent. Thus, the reduction in proportionate interest caused by the merger is as relevant to the characterization of boot distributed in the merger as is the reduction in interest produced by new investment in a Zenz redemption.
However, an integrated transaction analysis of boot need not lead, as
the Commissioner undoubtedly feared, to the unsatisfactory result
reached in McDonald v. Commissioner. As in the event of a Zenz redemption, the measurement of a shift in proportionate interest is not
simply a matter of comparing a stockholder's former holdings with the
interest obtained in an altered and greatly expanded corporation. Rather,
resulting corporation. See infra the discussion in the text accompanying notes
91-93. For the purpose of measuring this continuity, it is the established position
of the Service that redemptions incident to the reorganization are to be taken into
account, that is, integrated with the reorganization itself. Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.02,
1977-2 C.B. 568, superseded in part, Rev. Proc. 79-14, 1979-1 C.B. 496, superseded, Rev. Proc. 80-22, 1980-1 C.B. 654, superseded, Rev. Proc. 81-10, 1981-1
C.B. 647, superseded, Rev. Proc. 82-22, 1982-1 C.B. 469, modified and superseded, Rev. Proc. 82-60, 1982-45 I.R.B. 29 (Nov. 8). Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110, the Commissioner contended that a redemption
should be integrated with a stock exchange for the purpose of determining whether
a qualifying reorganization had occurred. The Commissioner under present policy
thus is in the absurd position of arguing that the boot must be integrated for the
purpose of testing for a reorganization but separated for the purpose of determining the character of the boot.
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the relevant factor is the extent to which the stockholder has disposed
of the old investment in a manner that accomplishes a shift of ownership.
The reduction in proportionate ownership attributable to the corporate
expansion is irrelevant to this question for the reasons stated in connection with the Zenz redemption: To this extent, the reduction in proportionate interest does not reflect a disposition. The calculation of the
extent to which recipients of boot have diminished their continuing proportionate interest in their old investment should only be made with
reference to the original value of that investment. Thus, after the transaction, a stockholder must be regarded as owning that proportion of his
prior investment that the value of his post-reorganization holding bears
to the value of his interest in the old corporation prior to the reorganization. Any further reduction in proportionate interest occasioned by the
merger is irrelevant to the chJtracterization of the boot.
The differences between these approaches can be illustrated using the
facts assumed in Revenue Ruling 75.,...83: Corporation X, the 60 outstanding shares of which were owned by individual A, is acquired in a
statutory merger by corporation Y, the 40 outstanding shares of which
were equally owned by individuals B, C, D, and E. (It is assumed the
value of an X share equals the value of a Y share.) In the merger, A
receives 35 shares of Y stock plus boot of $250x. Under its separate
transaction approach, the Service treated A's interest as merely changing
from 60/60 to 35/35 for no reduction in proportionate interest at all,
notwithstanding that A withdraws a substantial portion of his investment
from corporate solution and owns only 35 of the 75 shares of Y stock
outstanding after the reorganization. Under the court's analysis in McDonald v. Commissioner, A's interest would be regarded as declining
from 60/60 or 100 percent to 35/75 or 47 percent, the same result as
would be reached under a literal application of Revenue Ruling 75-447
in an analogous Zenz redemption. Under the approach suggested here,
A's interest would be regarded as falling from 60/60 to 35/60 or 58 percent, a computed reduction that accurately reflects the extent of A's disposition of his prior interest to B, C, D, and E. Quite plainly, the additional investment of the owners of the acquiring corporation should have
no effect on the character of A's disinvestment. Conversely, the shift in
ownership actually produced by A's disinvestment cannot properly be
ignored as the Commissioner has proposed.
The Inadequacy of Current Solutions
Before the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 75-83 formalizing
the separate transaction approach to boot characterization, the Eighth
Circuit was required to address the issue in a case that one can only wish
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had not arisen when it did. Posing pathological facts that have unduly
influenced subsequent authorities, Wright v. United States 46 probably
has retarded the evolution of a proper rule for more typical cases. The
taxpayer in Wright had owned a controlling interest in both of the corporations that were combined, F & G and World Wide. The corporations
were consolidated into a newly formed survivor, Omni. Boot was issued
to the taxpayer by the surviving corporation and was not allocated by
the parties with respect to the stock of the predecessor corporations.
Thus, the taxpayer exchanged his 99 percent interest in F & G and his
56 percent interest in World Wide for a 62 percent interest in Omni plus
boot in the approximate amount of $100,000.
Consistently with his later ruling, the Commissioner argued that the
boot should be characterized independently for each constituent corporation and without regard to the change in ownership produced in the
reorganization-the separate transaction approach. 47 The Commissioner
initially suggested that the boot be treated as issued entirely in redemption of stock of F & G-a redemption which, if viewed separately from
the reorganization, would yield only a de minimis change in ownership
and thus dividend treatment. During the argument of the case, however,
the government acknowledged that an allocation of the boot between F
& G and World Wide might also be appropriate. 48
The court rejected the Commissioner's separate and before analysis.
It plainly believed that an approach that almost invariably produced
dividend treatment to a dominant stockholder by ignoring the material
change of ownership that occurred in the same transaction was not sensible. 40 On the other hand, the Court did not embrace the integration
approach suggested by McDonald v. Commissioner, although this aspect
of the court's opinion has been widely misunderstood. uo Instead of
4 6482

F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 606. The Commissioner also argued, and the court agreed, that the
principles of § 302 should be applicable in characterizing the boot. Id.
4 8 I d. at 605-06. If all of the boot were treated as distributed by F & G, the taxpayer's interest would have been regarded as declining from 99.16% to 95.43%.
40 The court rejected the separate and before approach urged by the Commissioner on the ground that it was an "artificial" reading of § 302 that ignored the
continuation of the corporate entity. I d. at 608.
50 The court never suggested, nor apparently did the taxpayer, that the initial
99% interest should be compared with the resulting 62% interest. However, in
the only other modern appellate decision addressing the boot characterization
issue, the court seemed to think that the court in Wright had used the McDonald
approach. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), criticized
infra in text accompanying notes 63-68. See also Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot
Distributions in Corporate Reorganizations-Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 Tax Law. 287 (1977). The authors approve of the Wright decision and
clearly understand its holding but also appear to approve of the decision in
McDonald and to regard that case as a precedent for the decision in Wright.
47
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adopting either extreme method of characterization, the court developed
a compromise approach, the form of which was quite likely influenced
by the unusual facts before it. It held that the boot should be regarded
as distributed by Omni, the surviving corporation, in exchange for the
stock in Omni that would have been issued had there been no boot at all.
Thus, the court compared the combined ownership interest of the taxpayer in the constituent corporations with his ownership interest in the
same assets after the transaction.111
Several aspects to the compromise solution suggested in Wright must
be examined separately. Arguably, the special problem of overlapping
ownership, considered below, was the only issue addressed in Wright,
for there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the court was purporting to espouse a principle of boot characterization that would apply in
the absence of the special facts of that case. Nevertheless, both the Commissioner and later cases involving boot characterization have speculated
on how the rule of that case might be applied in the absence of overlapping ownership.
Applying the Wright principle to the example used above, A's interest
is regarded as declining from the interest he would have received if no
boot had been issued, 60/100, with his actual resulting interest, 35/75.
The substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b) (2) is met because A's retained interest of 35/75 or 47 percent is 78 percent of his
prior interest of 60 percent. Thus, relative to the approach suggested
here, the Wright formula significantly understates the extent to which
A's interest has been reduced and therefore is more likely to produce
dividend treatment. 52
51 In the district court the taxpayer had made the rather curious argument that
the transfer of the stock of F & G and World Wide to Omni and the dissolution
of the constituent corporations were separate transactions and that accordingly
the taxpayer's exchange of stock was free of tax under § 351, rather than the
reorganization provisions. Had that been the case, the boot would have been taxed
at capital gains rates since that section lacks a dividend equivalence provision.
Somewhat ironically, in view of his position on the characterization issue, the
Commissioner prevailed on this point by demonstrating that the formation of
Omoi and the dissolution of the constituent corporations were steps in an integrated transaction. 72-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ~ 9495 (E.D. Ark. May 24, 1972).
52 The suggested approach, in contrast, makes it more likely that a redemption
will meet the additional requirement of the substantially disproportionate test that
the redemption leave the redeemed stockholder with less than 50 percent of the
corporation's voting stock. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2) (B). This limitation is presumably
applied when the rules of § 302(b) are borrowed for use under § 356. The before
and after percentages are both lower under the Wright approach than under the
approach advocated here. (In the example, they are 60 and 47 percent under
Wright and 100 and 58 percent under the advocated approach.) The 50 percent
limitation is thus more likely to be met if the Wright approach is used. The decline in proportionate interest is greater under the advocated approach, in coo-
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The reason for this difference is that like Revenue Ruling 75-83, the
Wright formula is a separate rather than an integrated transaction approach. Rather than treating the boot distribution as occurring prior to
the merger, as would Revenue Ruling 75-83, the Wright court viewed
the distribution as occurring after the merger. Both approaches give
effect to the change in ownership attributable to the boot distribution
but not to the change in ownership produced by the merger. By treating
A's former interest as 60/100, the proportionate interest already diluted
by the merger, the Wright approach eliminates that reduction in interest
from the section 302(b)(2) computation. Accordingly, the Wright approach is objectionable for precisely the same reason as is the separate
transaction approach of the Service which the court in Wright rejected.G 3
Although the Service has rejected the Wright approach in favor of its
harsher separate and before analysis, Wright emerges as more favorable
to a finding of dividend equivalence than the integrated approach endorsed by the Service in the analogous redemption context. Given the
weakness of the Service's own separate transaction analysis, it may seem
surprising that the Commissioner did not immediately embrace the reasoning of the Wright court. One explanation for this resistence may be
that the Commissioner, with one fearful eye fixed on McDonald v. Commissioner, never understood Wright. Revenue Ruling 75-83, the Commissioner's response to the decision in Wright, initially illustrated his
disagreement with an example in which there was overlapping ownership.54 When reprinted in the Cumulative Bulletin, however, the example had been changed to assume a merger which lacked any overlaptrast, and the stockholder is thus more likely under this approach to meet the
other requirement of the substantiaily disproportionate test-that his proportionate interest after the transaction be less than 80 percent of what it was before.
I.R.C. § 302(b) (2) (C).
53 Although mergers do not normally result in corporate contractions, the error
of the Wright analysis can be seen quite clearly by comparing that approach with
the Zenz integration approach of Revenue Ruling 75-447. Adjusting the facts of
that ruling to the merger context, assume a target corporation with 100 shares of
stock outstanding and equaily owned by two stockholders is acquired by a corporation with 30 shares of stock outstanding and having the same value. In the
merger, each stockholder in the target corporation receives 30 shares of acquiring
corporation stock and boot of $20x. Under the approach of Revenue Ruling
75-447, each of the target stockholders would be regarded as having reduced his
interest from 50/100 to 30/90, thus retaining 67 percent of his investment. Under
the Wright approach, however, each would be regarded as reducing his interest
from 50/130 to 30/90. Under§ 302(b) (2), this reduction from a 38% interest
to a 33% interest, a retention of 87% of the prior investment, would be insufficient
to escape dividend equivalence under the substantially disproportionate rule, contrary to the holding in Revenue Ruling 75-447.
M The original version of Revenue Ruling 75-83 is described in Levin, Adess &
McGaffey, supra note 50, at 288 n.8. In that version, A owned all 60 shares of
corporation X and 10 of the 40 shares of corporation Y.
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ping ownership. In this merger, A exchanged all 60 of the outstanding
shares of the target corporation, X, for 35 shares of the acquiring corporation, Y, a corporation in which A had previously had no interest, and
boot of $250x. Y had 75 shares outstanding after the merger. The
ruling purports to illustrate the effects of the Wright decision on the facts
of the ruling, stating that under Wright A's interest would be regarded
as reduced "from 60 shares of Y stock to 35 shares." nn However, a proportionate change in interest cannot be computed unless the total shares
of stock outstanding, the denominator of the fraction, are specified.
Under the McDonald integration approach, A's interest would be regarded as declining from 60/60 to 35/75, while under the Wright postmerger redemption approach, the interest would be regarded as declining
from 60/100 to 35/75. On the assumed facts, either reduction satisfies
the substantially disproportionate test of section 302{b) (2), and it thus
is not fully clear how the Commissioner interpreted the Wright decision
or which of the tests he was rejecting. Both interpretations, however, are
inconsistent with the separate and before approach that the ruling clearly
did adopt.
Since the analysis of the court in Wright was erroneous, the reasoning
of the Commissioner in rejecting it might seem insignificant. However,
in an attempt to discredit Wright while bolstering its own rather weak
position, Revenue Ruling 75-83 sets forth an argument apparently
meant to suggest that in characterizing reorganization boot, only the
Commissioner's "separate and before" analysis is permissible. The argument, however, proves nothing of the kind.
The reasoning of Revenue Ruling 75-83 is not fully clear. While the
Commissioner's separate and before test is plainly set forth, the ruling
does not characterize its approach as a separate transaction approach
and does not consider the alternative possibility of an integrated approach. Moreover, in the only analysis contained in the ruling, the Commissioner explains his disagreement with the decision in Wright solely in
terms of the proper identification of the distributing corporation. The
ruling contends, undoubtedly correctly, that boot must be regarded as
distributed by the target corporation, whereas the court in Wright treated
the distribution as made by the resulting corporation.na Thus, the ruling
1975-1 C.B. at 113.
The ruling states only that the court in Wright erred in distinguishing cases
holding that "the amount of the dividend is measured by reference to the earnings
and profits of the transferor," that is, the target corporation. Since the holding
in Wright was that the distribution was not a dividend equivalent, there was no
occasion for the court either to distinguish or follow cases concerning earnings
and profits computations. However, the Commissioner's point was that the court
erred in treating Omni, rather than F & G or World Wide, as the distributing
corporation.
55

56
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could be read as suggesting, not that boot lacks factual integration with
the merger, but that the change in ownership produced by the merger is
irrelevant to the characterization of boot. That is, it may be the position
of the Commissioner that, even if the distribution of boot and the merger
itself are steps in an integrated transaction, the implicit requirement of
section 356 that the boot be treated as distributed by the target corporation also requires that the character of the boot be determined solely
by reference to the stockholders of the target corporation. The change
in ownership thus must be measured separately from and prior to the
merger. However, the identity of the distributing corporation should not
control the characterization issue.
In a boot characterization case, two quite separate questions are presented. One involves the computation of gain and, in the event of dividend equivalence, of earnings and profits, issues that depend on the
identity of the stock with respect to which the distribution is made. The
Commissioner's objection to Wright addresses these issues. The more
important question in Wright and Revenue Ruling 75-83, however, is
the manner in which the change in proportionate ownership is to be computed, whether under an integrated or a separate analysis and, if separate, whether before or after. It is not evident that the resolution of the
first issue has any implication at all for the resolution of the second.
Once the distributing corporation has been identified, the manner in
which the change in ownership of that corporation is to be measured
remains entirely open. Indeed, in the Zenz context, the identity of the
distributing corporation is clear but that identity does not bar taking into
account the change in ownership produced by the new investment.
If the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 75-83 has any relevance to the
characterization issue, it is limited to a rejection of the exclusive focus
in Wright on postreorganization holdings. There may be a conceptual
tension between the use of the tax attributes of the target corporations
for measuring gain while the distribution is characterized by reference
to the holdings in the resulting corporation. 57 However, the reasoning
As discussed below in the context of overlapping ownership, the Commissioner's
position here is well founded. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. At
least in the absence of the peculiar facts presented in Wright, the tax consequences
to stockholders liquidating a portion of their investment in the course of a reorganization should be determined solely by reference to the tax attributes of the
investment being liquidated.
57 While a tension may be conceded, it would not have been internally inconsistent for the court in Wright to resolve the characterization issue as it did, by
treating the distribution as made by the resulting corporation, but to measure the
taxpayer's gain by reference to the tax basis of his stock in the constituent corporations. Since the entire amount of the boot would have been subject to tax regardless of the identity of the distributing corporation, this issue was not material
to the court's decision.
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has no relevance to the choice between a separate and an integrated transaction approach. Under the integrated approach, it can readily be acknowledged that the target corporation is the distributor of the boot, but
the ownership dilution produced by the merger still must be taken into
account in testing for dividend equivalence. Indeed, in McDonald, the
court and both parties assumed that the tax attributes of the target corporation rather than those of the acquiring corporation were controlling,
even though the transactions were integrated for characterization purposes.58 Accordingly, while the reasoning contained in Revenue Ruling
75-83 may somewhat discredit the particular test employed in Wright,
it does not support the approach adopted by the Commissioner, nor does
it constitute an objection to an integrated approach either of the McDonald type or of the type suggested here.
Since the publication of Revenue Ruling 75-83, only the Fifth Circuit
has addressed the boot characterization issue. In view of the weakness
of the Commissioner's position, it was somewhat surprising that the court
in Shimberg v. United States 59 elected to adopt the same result. However, that court completely misunderstood the legal rules it was asked to
apply, and its decision cannot be regarded as rational support for Revenue Ruling 75-83. 00
Shimberg presented the boot characterization question in the traditional context. A relatively small corporation in which the taxpayer
owned 66 percent of the stock was merged into a far larger company in
a transaction which qualified as an A reorganization. The consideration
received consisted of common stock of the acquiring corporation and
substantial cash boot. The district court 01 correctly undertook to characterize the boot under section 356(a) (2) by applying the principles of
section 302 as construed in United States v. Davis. In testing for the
required "meaningful reduction" of proportionate interest, the court em58 52 T.C. at 86. Although in McDonald the distribution was treated ns a redemption rather than as a boot distribution, there was no suggestion that the
redemption should be treated as made by the acquiring corporation rather than
the target corporation.
59 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
60 In a subsequent Fifth Circuit decision in which the characterization of the
boot did not affect the amount of tax due, the court commented favorably on the
Shimberg opinion. General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056
(5th Cir. 1980). The principal issue posed by General Housewares was the fascinating but quite complex question of whether a transaction may be both a
reorganization and a liquidation. In holding that the transaction before it could
be both, the court relied heavily on the reduction in continuing ownership interest
by the stockholders of the target corporation from a 100 percent interest to a less
than one percent interest in the acquiring corporation. On the boot characterization issue, the court quite inconsistently commented favorably on its rejection
of such an integrated approach in Shimberg.
61415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
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ployed a McDonald-type analysis. It concluded that a reduction of ownership from 66 percent to less than one percent had occurred and that
the boot did not have the effect of a dividend. 62
In an entirely unsatisfactory opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed. The
court seemed to believe that the comparison made by the district court
was inseparable from the section 302 meaningful reduction test. 63 Since
the court understandably did not believe that the results produced by that
comparison were reasonable, it quite amazingly refused to apply the
Davis test. The court declined to follow the decision in Wright because
that court had also applied the meaningful reduction test. Apparently,
the Fifth Circuit did not understand that the court in Wright had not
applied the test in the same way as the district court. Instead, the court
concluded that any pro rata distribution of boot in a reorganization had
the effect of a dividend-thereby virtually returning to the completely
discredited 1945 decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford. 04 The
taxpayer contended that the distribution was not pro rata because of the
change in ownership produced by the reorganization, citing such cases
as Zenz v. Quinlivan, but the court rejected that line of authority because
it had arisen under section 302 and the court had already determined
that it would not apply the tests of that section. 65 Instead, the court held
that the distribution should be viewed as if made in a separate transaction
prior to the reorganization. Since such a distribution would not have
altered the proportionate interests of the stockholders, the court found
that the distribution had the effect of a dividend. The court referred to
the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1924 66 which introduced
the predecessor to section 356(a) (2). That history, the court said, provided an example of a situation in which dividend treatment was stated
to be appropriate in "virtually the same fact situation" as the case before
the court. 67 In fact, the example reproduced by the court involved a
merger into a shell corporation which presumably would not have produced any change in ownership interest. 68
/d. at 836.
577 F.2d at 288.
64 325 U.S. 283 (1945). Evidently aware of the harshness of its holding, the
Court noted that while the automatic dividend rule had applied to all boot distributions, its rule applied only to pro rata distributions. 577 F.2d at 290. Both approaches are identical, however, in their simplistic effort to apply a fixed rule without regard to material differences in the effect of the distributions.
65 577 F.2d at 290 n.18.
6 6 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1
(part 2) C.B. 241, 252.
67 577 F.2d at 289.
68 Even those commentators who favor the approach of Revenue Ruling 75-83
have acknowledged the "shortcomings" of the Shimberg opinion. See Samansky,
Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in Reorganizations, 31 CASE W.
62
63
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The existing authority on the characterization of boot represents an
extreme failure of analysis. Both the Commissioner and the two circuit
courts that have addressed the issue concluded, with ample justification,
that the integration approach suggested by McDonald v. Commissioner
was unreasonably favorable to avoiding dividend equivalence. A
thoughtful examination of the McDonald analysis would have disclosed
that it produced unreasonable results because it improperly gave effect
to fresh investment that expanded the corporate entity. Once the irrelevance of such investment is recognized, its effect can be eliminated from
the computation of the decline in proportionate interest, thereby yielding
a reasonable boot characterization that is consistent with the dllalysis of
the closely analogous Zenz redemption.
Overlapping Ownership
A stockholder receiving boot in a reorganization who owns stock in
both of the constituent corporations is a distinct source of confusion in
the analysis of the boot distribution. The stockholder's interest is both
reduced by the merger and the boot distribution and increased by the
interest he holds in the second corporation. The question, then, is the
relevance of this second interest to the characterization of the partial
liquidation of the first investment. If there is a single satisfactory answer
to this question, it is neither simple nor very tidy. Before demonstrating
how the principles employed above might be applied to overlapping
stockholdings, it will be profitable to review why the solutions thus far
proposed are erroneous.
The added fact that one or more stockholders of the target corporation
also own stock in the acquiring corporation cannot alter the propriety of
an integrated transaction approach. Thus, the solutions suggested in
Revenue Ruling 75-83 and in the Wright case-the only appellate decision to have considered the character of boot in a reorganization involving both overlapping ownership and a significant change in ownership
resulting from the merger 69-remain wrong for the reasons stated above.
REs. L. REv. 1, 34 (1980), where the author agrees with the statement in Revenue
Ruling 75-83 that a distribution of boot should be taxed as a dividend if the
distribution would have been so taxed in the absence of a reorganization. However, neither he nor the ruling explains why the change in ownership attributable
to the reorganization should be ignored when such a change is taken into account
in analogous Zenz transactions.
69 Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1022 (1967), also involved the reorganization of two corporations in which
there was substantial overlapping ownership. However, because the transaction
did not change proportionate interests, the distribution incident to the reorganization clearly was not entitled to sales treatment.
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The Wright decision, however, contains a further error that is peculiar
to overlapping stockholdings. In Wright, it may be recalled, the court
blended the taxpayer's two investments, treating them as one, and characterized the boot distribution by reference to the aggregate disinvestment. Moreover, the court treated the boot as distributed by the newly
formed resulting corporation in exchange for its stock, rather than as a
disposition of the stock of the constituent corporations. The Commissioner, both before the court in Wright and in Revenue Ruling 75-83,
contested each of these elements in the court's analysis. To that extent,
the Commissioner was clearly correct.
At the stockholder level, a reorganization is merely an exchange of one
corporate investment for another which would be a taxable exchange 70
but for the nonrecognition provisions of the Code. 71 Under those provisions, a stockholder's gain on an exchange is taxed only to the extent
that he receives boot in addition to stock in the surviving corporation.
If a tax is imposed on the receipt of boot, it is a tax on gain realized upon
the exchange of stock in the target corporation for stock in the acquiring
corporation. 72 Both in fact and in the contemplation of the reorganization provisions of the Code, the stock disposed of is the stock of the
target corporation. Like a simple redemption, boot in a reorganization
may more nearly resemble either the proceeds of a sale or the distribution
of a dividend and thus can be taxed as either. 73 Regardless of how the
70 See, e.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925), arising prior to the
enactment of the reorganization provisions. There have been occasional sug·
gestions, not generally accepted, that a nonstatutory form of reorganization may
exist. See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). See also Telephone Answering
Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), reviewed (3 dis.), aff'd, 39
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) ~ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
( 1977). Under the existing statutory pattern, such decisions are probably best
viewed as an expansive construction of the F reorganization. See infra note 87.
71 For corporate reorganizations, the principal sections affecting stockholders
are §§ 354, 355, and 356. The Code contains several other nonrecognition provisions that operate similarly, including tolerances for taxable boot. See e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 1031 through 1039.
72 Under § 1001, gain or loss is realized on the exchange of stock in the target
corporation. When § 356 requires that "the gain" be recognized, in the event of
boot, it is the realized gain to which the section refers. See BrrrKER & EusTICE,
supra note 13, at ~ 14.34.
73 The stockholder has exchanged his interest in the target corporation for an
interest in the acquiring corporation-the equivalent under the tax law to a sale.
But in a merger, or practical merger under § 368(a)(1)(C), the two forms of
acquisitive reorganization in which boot is permitted, the acquiring corporation
becomes the continuation of the target corporation as part of the same transaction.
Thus, the stock has been "sold" to the corporation in which the stockholder has
an interest, the equivalent of a redemption. If that "redemption" does not pro·
duce a material change in proportionate interest, § 356(a) (2) requires that it be
taxed as a dividend.
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boot is characterized, however, it remains a liquidation of a portion of
the stockholder's prior investment, and the tax consequences of the distribution must be determined by reference to the tax attributes of the
constituent corporation in which he was a stockholder.74
In the absence of overlapping stock ownership, the foregoing is not
questioned. 75 However, the mere fact that one or more stockholders of
the target corporation may also own stock in the acquiring corporation
does not alter the analysis. Dating back to the earliest decided cases,70
the taxing system has with surprising rigor recognized the corporate entity as separate not only from its individual stockholders 77 but also from
other corporations under common control. 78 Thus, an investment in one
74 When boot is taxed as the proceeds of a sale, it is quite clear that the stock
is the stock in the target corporation. However, when the boot is to be taxed as
a dividend, the Code is somewhat less clear concerning whether the dividend is to
be deemed distributed by the target or the acquiring corporation. Both § 356(a)(2)
and the regulations thereunder require taxation as a dividend to the extent of the
earnings and profits of "the corporation." Nevertheless, in the absence of overlapping ownership, commentators and practitioners alike have uniformly assumed
the more logical answer that the distributing corporation is the one in which the
recipient of the boot previously held an interest. See, e.g., BITTKER & Eusnca,
supra note 13, at ~ 14.34; Vrooman, Corporate Acquisitions-(A) Reorganization,
TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 77-3d, A-27 (1974). The question has not been much
addressed by the courts and when Revenue Ruling 75-83 asserted this position, it could only adduce scant authority. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235
F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934);
Rossv. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
75 When the distribution of boot is taxable as a dividend and both the target
and the acquiring corporations are controlled by the same stockholder, the Commissioner has been reluctant to permit the taxpayer's choice of target corporations
to control the earnings and profits limitation on dividend treatment. On such facts,
the Commissioner has taken the rather dubious position that both corporations
" should be regarded as transferors and thus that the earnings and profit<> of both
could be used to support dividend taxation. Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 C.B. 81.
While that argument was accepted in Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), it has more recently been rejected as inconsistent with the structure of § 356. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner,
614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); American Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970}, reviewed (2 dis.). Wright appears to
be the only case in which boot entitled to sales treatment was deemed attributable
to a disposition of stock of the acquiring corporation.
76 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), was partially based on this
principle.
77 Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). For current applications of this principle, see Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th
Cir. 1980), appeal filed (Feb. 16, 1982); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12
(1976), reviewed, aff'd, 1977-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) CJ 9240 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 1977).
78 The rigidity of this doctrine has led to several specific statutory modifications.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 304, 482, and 1239. This latter section is illustrative.
While assuming that, in general, such transactions are to be respected in accordance with their form, under a recent expansion of § 1239, sales of depreciable
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corporate entity is entirely separate from an investment in a second, and
transactions affecting one such investment cannot properly be offset by
transactions involving a second. No one would assert, for example, that
a dividend from one wholly-owned corporation could be offset by an
investment in a second, thereby exonerating the stockholder from tax on
the distribution. Similarly, a reduction in proportionate ownership of
one corporation cannot be offset by an expanded interest in a second,
even if these shifts in investment occurred as parts of the same transaction. Yet, that is precisely the effect of the commingling of the stockholdings that occurred in Wright.
The netting approach used in Wright measures only a fictitious change
in ownership that does not reflect the stockholder's disinvestment in either
of the constituent corporations. In fact, if boot is distributed with respect
to the stock of both constituent corporations in a consolidation such as
occurred in Wright, the stockholder's disinvestment in one corporation
may justify sales treatment even if the disinvestment in the second does
not. Yet the commingling approach taken in Wright conceals these different degrees of disinvestment and thus erroneously imposes a single
characterization upon a fictitious aggregation. 79
Accordingly, the Commissioner was correct in arguing in Wright that
the consequences of the distribution of boot must be measured separately
with respect to the stockholdings in each of the constituent corporations.
He was also correct in asserting in Revenue Ruling 75-83 that the distribution must be regarded as a disposition of the stock of the target
corporation in exchange for a distribution from that corporation. The
Commissioner was in error, however, in further asserting that the characterization of that distribution could be made without taking into account the change in stockholdings produced by the merger.
In taking an integrated transaction approach to the characterization
of boot in this context, the overlapping s~ockholdings should neither be
taken completely into account nor completely ignored. It arguably folproperty between two corporations, 80 percent or more of the stock of which is
owned by the same taxpayer, are denied capital gains treatment.
79 This effect of the Wright approach can be seen by assuming that individual
B owns 60 of 80 shares in corporation X and 10 of 50 shares in corporation Y.
In a consolidation, boot is distributed only to B in exchange for 25 of her X shares
and boot is also distributed to the Y stockholders pro rata in exchange for one half
of their stock. Under the Wright commingling approach, B's interest would be
regarded as changing from 70/ 130, or 54% to 40/80, or 50% . Since that decline
is not significant, B would undoubtedly receive dividend treatment under Wright.
However, B's interest in the X assets has in fact declined from a 75% interest to a
50% interest, a shift in interest to the other stockholders of Y that should entitle B
to sales treatment. On the other hand, her interest in the assets of Y has increased,
and therefore, the boot distributed to her with respect to the Y stock should
receive dividend treatment.
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lows from the foregoing objections to the decision in Wright that the
continuing investment in the acquiring corporation is entirely irrelevant
to the characterization of the disinvestment in the target corporation.
That is, the mere retention of the investment in the acquiring corporation should neither diminish nor enhance the extent of the disposition of
the investment in the target. On the facts of the first version of Revenue
Ruling 75-83, in which A owned all 60 shares in the target corporation
and ten of 40 shares in the acquiring corporation and received boot in
exchange for 25 of his 60 shares, his holdings in the target might be
regarded as reduced from 60/60 to 35/60, just as in the absence of overlapping ownership.
The result is neither obviously reasonable nor obviously unreasonable
in this and most other factual combinations. In some situations, however, this result is plainly wrong. Assume S owns 90 of 100 shares of
stock, all having the same value, of each of the target and acquiring
corporations and causes the distribution of boot in exchange for 50 shares
in the target corporation. Under this analysis, S's interest would be
deemed to decline from 90/100 to 40/100, thereby assuring S of sales
treatment. Nevertheless, it is intuitively obvious that S did not significantly reduce her proportionate ownership in the corporation or in the
surviving corporation, in which she owns 130 of 150 shares or 87 percent.
Evidently, the overlapping holdings must to some extent be taken into
account in measuring the stockholder's continuing interest. However,
the overlapping holdings cannot simply be added to the stockholder's
remaining holdings in the target corporation. Assume F owns 60 of 100
shares in the target corporation and 25 of 1000 shares in the acquiring
corporation, the shares are of equal value, and F receives boot of $25x
in exchange for 25 of his shares in the target. If F's original holdings in
the acquired were merely added to his remaining holdings in the target,
he would be regarded as retaining his entire investment, notwithstanding
the boot distribution. His interest would be regarded as changing from
60/100 before to (60- 25
25)/100 after, or unchanged. This is
plainly wrong. In the absence of any overlapping stockholdings, F would
have been regarded as having substantially reduced his proportionate
interest from 60/100 to 35/100, and would have been entitled to sales
treatment. It would be unreasonable if his ownership of a nominal interest in the acquiring corporation produced more than a nominal change
in his computed ownership. On these facts, a result reasonable in appearance could be produced by applying the Wright formula, but that
approach is wrong in principle and on other facts produces unreasonable results.
The basic premise of this article is that in computing a change in

+
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ownership, the retained ownership must be compared with a value no
greater than the value of the prior investment because it is only with
respect to that value that a disposition has occurred. It was observed
that a sale of stock at the corporate level resembles a sale at the stockholder level only to this extent and that further fresh investment is irrelevant. The denominator of the fractions that measure the proportionate
interests after the reorganization thus includes the fresh investment only
to the extent it replaces the investment withdrawn by the exchanging
shareholders as boot. To the extent that this fresh investment is attributable to the overlapping stockholdings in the acquiring corporation by the
recipient of the boot distribution, the stockholder should be treated as
retaining that proportion of his prior investment. Thus, the numerator
of the fraction for each shareholder should include that fraction of the
shareholder's interest in the acquiring corporation that equals the ratio
of the replacing fresh investment to the entire value of the acquiring
corporation.
Assume A, who owned 60 of the 100 outstanding shares of the target,
exchanges 35 of them for shares of the acquiring corporation of equal
value and 25 for boot of $25x. The other shareholders of the target exchange stock for stock only. A owned ten of the 40 shares of the acquiring corporation previously outstanding. The denominator of the fraction
depicting A's postreorganization interest is 100, representing the value
of the target remaining after the boot distribution ($75x) and $25x
attributable to the fresh investment by the acquiring corporation,
amounting to 25 I 40 of that fresh investment. The numerator of the
fraction must be similarly determined to be 41.25, the sum of 35, the
investment of A in the target which continues into the acquiring corporation, plus 6.25, which represents A's 25 percent interest in 25140 of
the acquiring corporation.
This analysis produces quite reasonable results in both of the examples
used earlier. F owned 601100 of the target and 2511000 of the acquiring corporation and received a boot distribution in exchange for 25
shares of the target. Intuitively, it appeared that F should be regarded
as continuing to hold just slightly more than 35 I 100 and should have
been entitled to sales treatment. Under the suggested analysis, F would
be regarded as retaining those 35 shares plus 2511000 of the retired 25
shares, or 0.625 shares. In the other example, S owned 901100 of each
corporation and received boot for 50 shares of the target. Under this
analysis, she would be regarded as retaining 40 shares in the target
corporation plus 901100 of the 50 shares exchanged for boot. Thus,
her interest would be regarded as declining from 901100 to (40
.9 X 50)1100, or 851100. The formula thus accurately reflects her
nominal decline in ownership and would produce dividend treatment.

+
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This solution to the problem of overlapping ownership is admittedly
somewhat complex and cannot be derived from the simple formula contained in section 302(b) (2). That section, however, does not address
the effect of simultaneous fresh irtvestment. On the other hand, this solution can be derived from an understanding of the nature of a transaction
involving a shift of .investment and of the relevance of fresh investment
to that transaction. Indeed, the proper solution to the characterization
of boot in the presence of overlapping ownership could not be obtained
in any other manner. Moreover, obtaining a reasonable solution to this
complex question, through the consistent application of the principles
and analyses suggested here, provides a further indication of the validity
of these suggestions.
Redemption of Acquiring Corporation's Stock
On occasion, it is the stockholders of the acquiring corporation rather
than those of the target corporation who wish to withdraw a portion of
their investment in connection with an acquisitive reorganization. The
choice of the corporate entity that will survive the merger or other reorganization is largely arbitrary. 80 While a variety of tax and nontax
factors may bear on the decision, the corporation that survives is often
simply the one whose management originated the merger proposal. The
stockholders of the target and acquiring corporations thus stand in an
identical relationship to the resulting entity. Nevertheless, because the
stockholders of the acquiring corporation do not exchange their stock
for stock of another corporate party to the reorganization, the provisions
that determine the tax consequences of the receipt of stock and boot in
a reorganization do not apply to the stockholders of the acquiring corporation.81 Section 302, not section 356(a) (2), governs distributions of
property incident to a reorganization to these stockholders. 82
As a result, a rather nice question is presented by a partial redemption
of stock of the acquiring corporation. Since section 302 applies, presumably the Zenz integration doctrine and the principles of Revenue
Ruling 75-447 also apply, and the change in stockholdings is computed
taking into account the change in ownership attributable to the merger.
It seems just too absurd, however, to apply one set of rules to stockholders of the acquiring corporation and another to the stockholders of
8o For this reason, it has been suggested that in a reorganization, both corporations and their stockholders should be treated alike. See, e.g., Turnier, Continuity of Interest-Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring Corporation,
64 CAL. L. REv. 902 (1976). However, they are not.
81 Reg.§ 1.354-1(a).
82See Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311.
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the target corporation when each group suffers an identical change in its
relationship to the continuing corporate entity.
The nice question is just another demonstration that Revenue Rulings
75-83 and 75-447 are inconsistent. 83 At the moment, the Commissioner
seems willing to tolerate the inconsistency. In at least one private ruling,
the Commissioner has applied the integration doctrine of Revenue Ruling
75-44 7 to a redemption of stock from stockholders of an acquiring corporation, and concluded that a substantially disproportionate redemption
occurred. 84 Interestingly, as a result of the combination of the merger
and redemption in this ruling, the size of the acquiring corporation remained unchanged, and the transaction did not include a distribution
of boot to stockholders of the target corporation. The nicer absurdities
of these rulings are yet to be fully illuminated.

Characterizing the Reorganization Itself
It is argued here that the present rules for the taxation of corporate
distributions accompanying new investment are inadequate. Because
those who fashioned the rules have not focused on the proper relevance
of the new investment to the distribution, the rules have not given the
new investment proper effect. Under Revenue Ruling 75-447, new investment is excessively influential in the event of a corporate expansion
through a Zenz transaction while, in characterizing boot, neither the
courts nor the Service has given sufficient weight to the investment. Having established an approach to analyzing fresh investment, a somewhat
more ambitious attempt can now be made to demonstrate that, in a more
complex version of the same shift in investment, the courts have also not
given proper weight to new investment in fashioning the tax consequences
to withdrawing stockholders.
The shifting of investment addressed herein can be accomplished
83 Since the choice of the corporation to survive the merger can frequently be
controlled by the parties, the inconsistency of these approaches may permit the
taxpayers to elect between sales or dividend treatment. See Horwood, Clarified
IRS Position Enhances Planning For Stock Redemptions With New Shareholders,
46 J. TAX'N 338 (1977). Not only is it undesirable for taxpayers to be able to
so manipulate their tax liabilities, it is also undesirable for such quirks in the taxing system to influence the form of business transactions.
Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 50, at 298-99, point out that under the
Wright approach, which they favor, boot distributed to stockholders of the target
is characterized in the same way regardless of which corporation is selected as the
target. However, since Wright is not consistent with Revenue Ruling 75-447,
distributions to the target stockholders are still characterized differently from
distributions to stockholders of the acquiring corporation.
84 LTR 8009108 (Dec. 10, 1979).
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through a variety of corporate manipulations. One of the more common
is a liquidation-reincorporation, a form of transaction which itself can
be executed in a variety of ways. An old corporation can be completely
liquidated and a portion of its assets contributed to a new corporation
formed by the stockholders of the old together with the new investors.
Alternatively, the old corporation can purport to sell a portion of its
assets to the new corporation and then liquidate completely.s:; In either
case, the old stockholders withdraw a portion of their investment from
corporate solution but continue as stockholders with their proportionate
interest diluted by the new investment Although the net effect of the
transaction is identical to the more simple Zenz redemption, not even the
most idealistic student of income taxation would suggest that a liquidation-reincorporation can routinely be recast as a Zenz redemption.86
The analogy may be apt, but there are competing analogies and principles of broader application-such as the integrity of the corporate entity-are at stake. 87 While the liquidation-reincorporation will be addressed under a different set of rules, the relevance of fresh investment
to the characterization of the disposition of an old investment is the same
under any set of rules.
The parties to such a transaction seek to achieve far more than capital
gains taxation of the net proceeds retained by the old shareholders. If
the steps are respected in accordance with their form as separately taxable transactions, the shareholders of the old corporation recognize all
s5 For a fuller discussion of the variants of liquidation-reincorporation transactions, and of the tax consequences sought by the parties, see Hjortb, Liquidations
and Reincorporations-Before and After Davant, 42 WASH. L. REv. 737, 740-44
(1967).
86 However, on appropriate facts, the Commissioner bas disregarded a statutory
merger and treated the overall transaction as a simple redemption. LTR 8025110
(Mar. 28, 1980).
87 While the new corporation may appear to be the mere continuation of the
old, it is in fact a separate legal entity and is so recognized by the taxing system.
See supra notes 77-78 and the accompanying text. Tax attributes of the old
corporation carry over to the new only if a reorganization bas occurred. See
I.R.C. §§ 358 (stockholder's basis), 362 (corporate basis), and 381 (other carryovers). Thus, the Iiquidation-reincorporation transaction normally cannot be
reconstructed as a mere redemption. The suggestion occasionally surfaces in the
case law and published rulings that a corporation can be a mere continuation of
another, without reference to the statutory reorganization provisions. See, e.g.,
Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
605 (1938); Telephone Answering Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423
(1974), reviewed (3 dis.), afl'd, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) CJ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8,
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Rev. Rul. 68-349, 1968-2 C.B. 143.
The suggestion is probably wrong but if valid, would amount to the assertion of
a nonstatutory from of reorganization having wholly unarticulated parameters.
Therefore, even a "mere continuation" would involve the application of a set of
rules far more complex than would a simple redemption.
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gain or loss inherent in their shares. Offsetting this, the new corporation
takes a basis for the reincorporated assets equal to their fair market value,
and the tax attributes of the old corporation, particularly its earnings and
profits account, disappear. However, all of these objectives are lost if
the overall transaction is a reorganization within the meaning of section
368(a) (1). In that event, the property retained by the old stockholders
is boot, which may have the effect of a dividend, and the tax attributes
of the old corporation, including the basis of its assets, carry over to the
new corporation. In the first instance, then, the character of the corporate distribution incident to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction is
a function of whether the transaction is a reorganization.
At first glance, the proper definition of a corporate reorganization appears quite removed from the issues considered thus far-the characterization of corporate distributions in redemptions and reorganizations. At
the level of technical statutory analysis, the issues are indeed quite different. At the level of income tax policy, however, the issues are strikingly
similar, except that the reorganization definition focuses attention on the
shareholders of the old corporation as a group rather than individually
as was previously the case. Thus, the question previously addressed was
whether the characterization of a distribution to a particular stockholder
should be affected by fresh investment obtained as a part of the same
transaction. In the present context, the question is whether the characterization of a transaction (in the form of a liquidation-reincorporation) as
a mere continuation of investmer..t pursuant to the reorganization provisions or as a termination of that investment should be affected by the
presence of fresh investment. In both contexts, the greater the significance accorded to fresh investment, the greater is the likelihood that the
shareholder will have sales treatment.
By virtue of the wealth of detail, statutory and interpretative, accompanying the definition of a reorganization, a wide variety of events may
cause a liquidation-reincorporation transaction to be regarded as sufficiently altering the character of the old shareholders' investment interest
to preclude reorganization characterization. That definitional detail,
however, is not of present interest. It is assumed that the liquidationreincorporation transactions examined comply with all requirements for
reorganization treatment except those pertaining to the question here
addressed: the extent to which fresh investment alone can properly cause
what would otherwise be characterized as a reorganization to be treated
instead as a disposition subject to capital gains taxation.
Over the surprisingly weak objections of the Commissioner, relatively
sparse case law has established the proposition, now widely accepted,
that the mere addition of fresh investment to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction causes the transaction to fall outside the scope of the
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reorganization provisions of the Code. That is, in this context, fresh
investment alone can convert a mere continuation of an incorporated
investment into a termination of that investment, taxed as a sale. The
granting of such extreme significance to fresh investment is inconsistent
not only with the present rules governing Zenz redemptions and boot
distributions but also with the rule suggested here. The consequence of
this faulty analysis of fresh investment is that taxpayers willing to take
this more circuitous route can obtain far more favorable income tax
consequences for their distributions of corporate profits than can be obtained through the financially identical Zenz redemption. If the relevance of fresh investment to the characterization of the transaction were
evaluated properly, the consequences of the liquidation-reincorporation
would be virtually identical to the Zenz redemption.
The Proper Relevance of Fresh Investment:
Continuity of Interest Test

Aside from the statutory detail, a transaction is a reorganization if the
investment of the stockholders of an old corporation is continued into
a new one in a form insufficiently altered to warrant, as a matter of tax
policy, the imposition of tax. A finding that a transaction is not a reorganization thus implies that the investment has been so changed that
the transaction should be treated as a disposition of the prior investment.
The characterization of the transaction is made on an overall basis, addressing the change in the form of the investment of the old stockholders
as a group.88 From the earliest cases arising under the reorganization
provisions, the courts have been attentive to this fundamental character
of a reorganization and have actively undertaken to limit reorganization
treatment to transactions that, in substance, produced continuations of
the prior investment. Independently of the statutory definition, the courts
have evolved a judicial conception of the essence of a reorganization and
88 The wisdom of extending nonrecognition treatment to individual stockholders
as a function of the continuity of interest by the stockholders as a group has
recently been questioned by the American Law Institute. AU, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PRoJECT (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977) (Corporate Acquisitions (except for
Special Limitations on Loss Carryovers)). Moreover, the study proposes to
eliminate the continuity of interest test for reorganization treatment and disconnect
the consequences of a corporate combination at the corporate level from the
consequences at the stockholder level. For discussions of these proposals, see
Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Distributions, 33 TAX LAw. 743 (1980); Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and the
American Law Institute Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979). The suggested downgrading
of the continuity test is not inconsistent with the treatment of fresh investment
suggested herein.
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have insisted that a transaction conform to that conception before allowing reorganization treatment, notwithstanding that the transaction meets
the literal requirements of the statutory definition. 89
One result of these judicial efforts has been the continuity of interest
doctrine, which requires that the old stockholders as a group retain a
"definite and substantial" proprietary interest in the affairs of the continuing corporation. 90 The continuity of interest doctrine serves a function in the reorganization definition similar to the function of section 302
in the taxation of redemptions. The doctrine defines the reduction in the
continuing interest of the prior stockholders that is deemed so substantial
as to require that their exchange be taxed as a sale. Obviously, the results of this measurement are different under the reorganization provisions than they are under section 302. The reorganization provisions
require that the overall transaction be characterized as either a reorganization or a taxable transaction. That characterization has implications
with respect to the holdings of all parties to the transaction. Under section 302, by contrast, the determination characterizes only the redemption distribution. Notwithstanding these differences in the significance
of the determinations under the continuity of interest doctrine and section
302, both sets of rules apply an essentially identical approach to the
definition of a disposition.
The standard formulation of the continuity test, now contained in
Revenue Procedure 77-37, 91 is that continuity of interest is present if
the stockholders of the target corporation acquire stock in the acquiring
corporation "which is equal in value, as of the effective date of the reorganization, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly
outstanding stock of the [target] corporation as of the same date." Continuity, therefore, is a function of the extent to which the stockholders of
the target corporation have retained their prior investment. Their continuing interest has always been measured with respect to the value of
that investment immediately prior to the reorganization.
In so measuring the continuity of interest retained by the old stockIn addition to the continuity of interest test, early decisions established the
requirement that a reorganization serve a business purpose and applied a step
transaction analysis for determining whether the spirit, as well as the form, of the
statutory requirements had been met. See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d
732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1934), af}'d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
90 The doctrine originated in the early decisions in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage
Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), and Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). The
ultimate form of the requirement was fashioned in LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S.
415 (1940). See generally BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 13, at ~ 14.11.
91 § 3.02, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
89

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1983]

FRESH INVESTMENT

461

holders, fresh investment attributable to the acquiring corporation is
entirely relevant. 92 Without this fresh investment, there would be no
change in the ownership of the target corporation as a result of corporate
distributions incident to the transaction and no occasion to question the
continuity of ownership. The corporation might contract and the proportionate interests in the corporation might shift among the old stockholders but, absent new investment or direct sales of stock to new investors, the old stockholders as a group would retain complete ownership
of the resulting corporation. Therefore, to the extent that fresh investment obtained in a reincorporation produces a result that is the functional equivalent of a direct sale of stock at the shareholder level, that
investment creates a discontinuity of interest. However, fresh investment
attributable to the acquiring corporation which has the effect of expanding the resulting corporate entity beyond the preacquisition size of the
target is wholly irrelevant to the test and, thus, to the characterization of
the reorganization. 93 As a result, the proportionate interests of the old
stockholders in the resulting corporation are not relevant. A reorganization remains free of tax and is not treated as a disposition even if the old
stockholders convert their 100 percent interest in the target into an insignificant fractional interest in the acquiring corporation.
While the formulation of the continuity of interest test in Revenue
Procedure 77-37 is entirely appropriate in the context of acquisitive reorganizations resulting in corporate expansions, the context in which the
rule was fashioned, it must be modified to accommodate corporate contractions, which typically occur in liquidation-rcincorporations. In any
such transaction in which the old stockholders withdraw from corporate
solution an amount exceeding 50 percent of the net worth of the target
corporation, the test as formulated by Revenue Procedure 77-37 is not
met. Even in the total absence of fresh investment, a pro rata distribution of liquid assets incident to a reincorporation thus may cause the
transaction to fail the continuity of interest test under this formulation
and to be treated as a complete liquidation. Since the old stockholders
have retained complete ownership of their incorporated investment in
this case, the result is plainly wrong. A mere distribution not accom92 More generally, any transfer of an ownership interest from the old stockholders of the target corporation to a new owner is relevant to the continuity of
interest test. Thus, discontinuity can also be produced by a direct sale of stock
by a target stockholder, incident to the reorganization, whether to the acquiring
corporation or to an outsider to the transaction. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2
C.B. 568. Whether a sale is factually related to the reorganization can pose a
difficult question. See McDonald's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981),
rev'd, 688 F.2d 520, (7th Cir. 1982).
9 3 See, e.g., Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); General
Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
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panied by any shift in proportionate interest does not amount to a disposition; reorganization treatment is clearly appropriate.
Neither the Commissioner nor the courts have applied this traditional
formulation of the continuity of interest doctrine to a corporate contraction incident to a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. In Revenue Ruling 61-156, 94 in which the Commissioner set forth his basic position with respect to such transactions, the net worth of the resulting
corporation was approximately one third of the value of the liquidated
predecessor. Stockholders of the old corporation obtained 45 percent
of the stock of the new corporation while new investors acquired 55 percent. Although the ruling does not expressly define the continuity of
interest test that it applied, it treats the old shareholders as retaining a
45 percent continuity of interest which, the ruling concludes, was sufficient to permit reorganization characterization. Similarly, in the two
cases in which the Commissioner has asserted that liquidation-reincorporations were F reorganizations, notwithstanding the presence of fresh
investment, the transactions produced substantial corporate contractions. 05 While in both cases reorganization treatment was denied, in
neither did the court suggest that the absence of continuity of interest
was a factor in the decision. 96
Consistently with the measurement of the continuing proportionate
interest of a stockholder following a simple redemption, in a reorganization resulting in a corporate contraction, continuity must be measured
with respect to the value of the continuing corporate entity. Continuity
of interest is present in such a case if the stockholders of the old corporation emerge from the transaction owning at least 50 percent of the stock
of the resulting corporation, giving full effect to any fresh investment.
This continuity of interest test takes fresh investment into account, for
the purpose of determining whether a disposition should be taxed as a
sale, in exactly the same manner as it is suggested here that section 302
should take fresh investment into account, for the same purpose, in connection with a Zenz redemption or a boot distribution. To the extent
1961-2 C.B. 62.
Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), af}'d, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.).
96 A corporate contraction commonly occurs in a recapitalization consitituting
a reorganization under§ 368(a) (1) (E). In that context, the courts and the Commissioner have agreed that continuity of interest is not broken merely because a
majority of the stock is exchanged for debt. However, this result has been
achieved, not by recognizing that a modification of the continuity doctrine must
be made for corporate contractions, but by asserting that the doctrine does not
apply to E reorganizations. See Hickok v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 80 (1959),
nonacq., 1959-2 C.B. 8, nonacq. withdrawn, 1977-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul. 77-415,
1977-2 C.B. 311.
94

95
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that the old stockholders shift their ownership of the old corporation to
new investors through the combined effect of a corporate distribution and
fresh investment, but only to that extent, the fresh investment is relevant
to the characterization of the transaction.
If a corporate combination meets this continuity of interest test, the
presence of fresh investment should not be a ground for denying reorganization treatment. The relevance of fresh investment to the reorganization definition is given full effect in the continuity of interest doctrine;
the investment has no greater relevance.
Fresh investment is not given any greater relevance in an acquisitive
reorganization or Zenz transaction. An acquisitive reorganization which
passes the continuity of interest test is not barred from reorganization
treatment regardless of the further level of fresh investment that may be
obtained. There is no reason for a different approach to fresh investment
in the context of an F reorganization than is applied by the courts to an
acquisitive reorganization or to an analogous Zenz redemption. Fresh
investment alone is not reflective of a disposition and does not alter the
character of a reincorporation any more than it alters the character of an
acquisitive reorganization or a Zenz redemption.
Nevertheless, the courts have attached a significantly greater importance to fresh investment in the definitions of the nondivisive D and the
F reorganizations. While that greater importance may arguably have
been required by the specific statutory requirements for the nondivisive
D reorganization, its significance to the F reorganization is entirely of
judicial manufacture. In so exalting the importance of fresh investment
in the definition of the F reorganization, the courts committed a clear
error which allows taxpayers to obtain far different tax consequences
upon a shift in investment executed pursuant to a liquidation-reincorporation than pursuant to a Zenz redemption.

Historical Treatment of
Liquidation-Reincorporations
The statutory definitions of the several categories of reorganizations
have become excessively technical and complex. Fortunately for present
purposes, little of that technicality is of interest. Broadly speaking, three
types of reorganizations are recognized by section 368: acquisitive,07
97 Acquisitive reorganizations are described in§§ 36S(a)(l)(A), (B), and (C)
as including, respectively, statutory mergers and consolidations, stock acquisitions,
and asset acquisitions, including countless hybrids and variations. For such reorganizations, the statutory requirements are quite technical and precise. For that
reason, only the most extraordinary failure of planning could cause a liquidation-
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divisive, 98 and merely formaJ.9 9 If a liquidation-reincorporation transaction is to be a reorganization, it must fall within the last category,
specifically the nondivisive D or F reorganization.
The D Reorganization

In the earliest efforts to impose reorganization treatment on these
transactions, the Commissioner relied upon the nondivisive D. 100 That
provision, however, together with the provisions of section 354 with
which the distribution must comply, imposes an impressive series of prerequisites to reorganization treatment, which, if applied at all literally,
would have made the nondivisive D a useless weapon against the liquidation-reincorporation.101 It requires that a "corporation" transfer "substantially all" 102 of its assets to another corporation and then distribute
reincorporation transaction to fall within the definition of one of the acquisitive
reorganizations.
os Divisive reorganizations are endorsed by one of the two categories of reorganizations described in § 368(a)(1)(D). The D reorganization contemplates
the formation of a corporate subsidiary, but then requires that the stock of the
subsidiary be distributed to the stockholders of the parent in a manner that complies with either § 354 or § 355. A divisive reorganization is one in which the
distribution complies with § 355; that can only occur if after the transaction two
or more corporations exist and are actively engaged in business. I.R.C. § 355(b)(l).
Thus, the transactitons in question normally cannot be a divisive D reorganization.
99 In addition to the two reorganizations discussed in the text, § 368{a) (1) (E)
treats a recapitalization as a reorganization. However, since that provision appears limited to the recapitalization of a single corporation, a reincorporation
cannot normally be an E reorganization. See BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 13,
at 1) 14.17.
A reincorporation may encompass not only a shift in investment but also an
alteration in the nature of the securities retained by the old stockholders. In that
event, before nonrecognition treatment can be imposed upon the transaction, it
may need to be regarded as an E reorganization and another form of formal reorganization. That necessity creates considerable confusion for, in a startling and
quite off-hand passage in an early opinion, the Supreme Court once remarked that
to obtain reorganization treatment, a transaction must consist of only one of the
formal changes. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
Thus, if the transactions combined two immaterial changes, it could not be a reorganization. While the logic of that limitation is elusive at best and the Service
has announced its disagreement with the Court (Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B.
62), it remains uncertain what result would be reached by the Supreme Court
today. The requirement of only one formal change per transaction may remain
as a technical limitation upon the treatment of the transaction in question as a
reorganization.
100 Baker, Recent Developments in the Service's War Against LiquidationReincorporations, 49 J. TAX'N 82 (1978). See also Lane, The Reincorporation
Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1218 (1964).
101 Hertzog, The Reincorporation Problem in Subchapter C: A Question of
Semantics?, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 928, 930-31 {1968).
1 0 2 I.R.C. § 354(b)(1).
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all of its property, including the stock or other property received in exchange for its assets, to its stockholders "in exchange" for their stock in
the old corporation. 103 Moreover, these stockholders must then "control" the newly formed corporation by owning at least 80 percent of the
voting power of its outstanding stock and 80 percent of the number of
all nonvoting shares outstanding. 104
From the very beginning, however, the courts adopted extremely hoeral constructions of the requirements of the nondivisive D when they
were needed to impose reorganization treatment upon what appeared a
mere reincorporation of the predecessor corporation. The transfer of as
little as 15 percent of the assets of the old corporation has been regarded
as "substantially all" when these assets permitted the continuation of the
old business. 105 The requirement that the old corporation distribute all
of its property has in effect been waived, the court treating the retained
property as constructively distributed and reinvested. 106 Similarly, the
predicate for nonrecognition at the stockholder level, an exchange of
securities, has been ignored when the stockholders received the stock of
the new corporation directly upon its formation. 107
On the other hand, the courts, almost uniformly, have been unwilling
to introduce any degree of flexibility in the requirement that the old
stockholders must control the new corporation. No decision has found
a D reorganization where over 20 percent of the stock of the new corporation was owned by persons who had not been stockholders in the old
corporation or closely related to these stockholders. 108 In general, the
Commissioner does not appear to have seriously argued that a D could
be found on such facts. In Gallagher v. Commissioner, 100 the first case
arising under the 1954 Code to present such facts, the Commissioner
I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (D).
I.R.C. § 368(c).
105 Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Moffatt
v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967).
106 Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962), reviewed.
1 07 Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981); James Armour,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964), appeal dismissed.
1os Although the stock attribution rules of the Code are not applicable to the
reorganization provisions in general or to the 80 percent requirement of §
368(a)(1)(D) in particular, the Commissioner has succeeded in two relatively
recent cases in persuading a court to find a D reorganization although over 20
percent of the stock of the new corporation was owned by persons who were not
stockholders of the old corporation but were related to the continuing stockholders.
Ringwalt v. United States, 549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906
(1977) (Clifford trust); Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975)
(wife). For an earlier decision to the contrary, see Breech v. United States, 439
F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971).
109 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.).
1o3

104
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specifically declined to assert the application of the D reorganization.
Three years later, the argument was made in Berghash v. Commissioner, 110 but only in a relatively weak form and as a secondary argument. It is far from clear why the Commissioner and the courts, which
had shown such creativity in avoiding the other statutory requirements
for a D reorganization, lapsed into such literalism in the face of fresh
investment. The substantive distortion of the statutory description of the
D reorganization that would result from a relaxation of the requirement
of 80 percent control would be no greater than the distortion that occurred in relaxing the requirements that the old corporation transfer substantially all of its assets to the new corporation and that it distribute all
of its remaining assets to its stockholders in exchange for their stock. It
can be inferred that the courts, and possibly the Commissioner, perceived
that the addition of fresh investment possesses a substantive importance
that could not be brushed aside, that fresh investment is not compatible
with a formal reorganization.U 1
uo 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966). The Commissioner
placed reliance upon the finding of an F reorganization under the approach set
forth in Revenue Ruling 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 112-117.
111 There is some support for the suspicion that the Commissioner was at least
equivocal regarding the relationship between fresh investment and the nonacquisitive reorganizations in the Commissioner's contemporaneous, and perhaps continuing, attitude towards the divisive D reorganization. While the Commissioner was
somewhat reluctantly arguing that fresh investment perhaps ought not destroy a
nondivisive D reorganization, he was quite clearly asserting that fresh investment
should destroy a divisive D.
It sometimes happens that an acquiring corporation in a contemplated acquisitive reorganization does not wish to take all of the assets of the target company.
One solution is to segregate the unwanted assets into a separate corporate entity
which is distributed to the stockholders of the target company prior to the acquisition in what the taxpayers characterize as a tax-free, divisive D reorganization.
For many years, the Commissioner took the position that a subsequent acquisitive
reorganization involving either the old corporation or its newly distributed subsidiary would destroy the tax-free character of the divisive reorganization for the
stated reason that divisive and acquisitive reorganizations were inherently incompatible. See Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, 799-800 (4th Cir.
1966). Although the illogic of the Commissioner's position did not prevail, and
this limitation of the divisive D has now been somewhat eroded, his litigating
position with respect to the divisive D reorganization was plainly inconsistent
with a liquidation-reincorporation analysis.
Moreover, the Commissioner apparently continues to adhere to a strict application of the control requirement for a divisive D reorganization. When the corporate division involves a preexisting subsidiary, the transaction need only comply
with the distribution requirements of § 355 and does not have to be a D reorganization. I.R.C. § 355(a)(2)(C). In that situation, the Commissioner will not
attack an acquisitive reorganization involving either the old parent or the old
subsidiary. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125. Nor will the Commissioner attack an acquisitive reorganization involving the distributing corpora-
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The F Reorganization

Rather than confront this statutory limitation on the use of the D reorganization, the Commissioner turned to the F reorganization. Early
case law, however, had suggested that this type of reorganization, described in section 368(a) (1) (F) as a "mere change in identity, form,
or place of organization, however effected," was of very narrow scope. 112
Perhaps for that reason, the Commissioner has not argued that such a
reorganization can include the obtaining of fresh investment by a continuing corporation. Rather, in Revenue Ruling 61-156, 113 the Commissioner adopted the position that even though fresh investment was
obtained contemporaneously with a reincorporation and as a part of a
single overall plan, the investment could nevertheless be regarded as a
"separate transaction" from the reincorporation.
The ruling addressed a transaction in which an existing corporation
formed a shell corporation to which it transferred all of its assets in exchange for stock and notes of the shell and cash obtained through a borrowing. Immediately following this reincorporation, the old corporation
was liquidated, and the new corporation made a public issue of its stock,
leaving the old stockholders with a 45 percent interest in the new corporation and the new investors with 55 percent The ruling divided the
transaction into three components: the public offering, the reincorporation and the recapitalization, and the distribution. The analysis of the
relationships among these components was vague at best. The ruling
asserted that the fresh investment could be "disregarded as being a separate transaction" in analyzing the balance of the transaction because the
"dominant purpose" of the transaction was to withdraw funds from a continuing corporate entity and that purpose was achieved without the stock
issuance. The ruling contained no facts to support its characterization
of the dominant purpose of the transaction, except that the amount of the
distribution to the old stockholders exceeded the amount of the fresh
tion following aD reorganization. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148;
Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83. However, to date, the Commissioner has not
endorsed the acquisition of a distributed corporation, newly formed in a D reorganization. Rather, the Commissioner appears to take the position that such an
acquisition would violate the control requirement of a D reorganization, thus
destroying the D .and possibly converting the acquisitive reorganization into a taxable transaction. See Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80. See generally Handler,
Variations on a Theme: The Disposition of Unwanted Assets, 35 TAX L. REV. 389
(1980). The anomaly so produced seems less reflective of principle than of
technical construction.
112 In Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1942), the
Supreme Court bad stated that "a transaction which shifts the ownership of the
proprietary interest in a corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity, form, or
place of incorporation.' "
113 1961-2 C.B. 62.
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investment. It thus was unclear whether the Commissioner was referring
to particular, undisclosed facts of the transaction in question or was suggesting that such a purpose, and thus separation, could always be inferred
from a reincorporation transaction resulting in a corporate contraction.
In the former case, which seems unlikely, the ruling would not be of
general significance. In the latter, the analysis is flatly inconsistent with
other applications of the step transaction doctrine. Most particularly,
the ruling, under the latter reading, is contrary to the Zenz integration
doctrine which the Commissioner has fully accepted and repeatedly
extended. 114
The separate treatment of the fresh investment, the ruling concluded,
permitted the treatment of the balance of the transaction as an "(E) and
(F)" reorganization "coupled with a withdrawal of funds." ur; The ambiguous word "coupled" likely reflects the Commissioner's uncertainty
about the separate character of that aspect of the transaction. While
the ruling concluded that the distribution was separate from the reorganization, it contained no independent reasoning with respect to the issue
and merely contained the non sequitur that "viewing the issuance of
stock . . . as a transaction separate from the reorganization, it is concluded that the distribution" should be treated as a separate dividend
taxable under section 301. 116
While the analysis contained in Revenue Ruling 61-156 is thus somewhat obscure, the Commissioner seemed to be asserting that the two
corporate actions were lacking a sufficient identity of purpose and interdependence to be treated as factually related. By negative implication
the ruling thus appeared to concede the relevance of fresh investment to
the characterization of the transaction and the incompatibility of fresh
investment and a formal reorganization occurring as parts of the same
transaction. With this concession, reorganization treatment was precluded unless the Commissioner was able to pursuade a court that the
investment and the reincorporation were factually unrelated.
In two cases arising shortly after the publication of Revenue Ruling
61-156, the Commissioner was unable to pursuade the Tax Court of
this. 117 Consequently, the court concluded that far more had occurred
than a mere shift in the place of incorporation and that the transaction
could not be considered an F reorganization.
114 When Revenue Ruling 61-156 was issued, the Zenz doctrine had not been
expanded to its present scope. However, the Commissioner has yet to refine the
approach taken in the 1961 ruling.
115 1961-2 C.B. 62, 63.
116 Id. at 65.
117 Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), afl'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.).
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Inadequacy of Current Law
As a result of relatively slim case law, the characterization of corporate

distributions incident to a liquidation-reincorporation has come to be
controlled by the level of fresh investment attracted as a part of the transaction.118 Transactions that otherwise would be regarded as possessing
a sufficient continuity of investment interest to be treated either as nondivisive D or as F reorganizations are instead treated as taxable dispositions of the prior investment in the presence of fresh investment. As a
result, corporate distributions by way of a purported corporate dissolution are automatically eligible for favorable capital gains taxation rather
than being subjected to the more discriminating tests of section 302,
applicable to redemptions or reorganization boot.
This is plainly in error, as can be demonstrated by examining the
factual circumstances presented in Gallagher v. Commissioner. 110 In a
classic liquidation-reincorporation, five stockholders of the old corporation who owned 62 percent of its stock formed a new corporation which
purchased the assets of the old. The five stockholders acquired 72 percent of the stock of the new corporation and the balance was acquired
by seven employees of the company. In the liquidation of the old corporation, approximately $400,000 was distributed to stockholders who did
not participate in the new company and $670,000 was distributed to the
five continuing stockholders, of which $220,000 was reinvested in the
new corporation. The new investors contributed a total of $82,000 for
their stock.
The Gallagher transaction could as easily have been accomplished by
a Zenz redemption in which the stockholders of the old corporation
caused all or a portion of their stock to be redeemed and the corporation
sold new stock to its employees. Since the corporation did not expand
as a result of the new investment, Revenue Ruling 75-447 properly
would be applicable to the characterization of the distributions to the
continuing stockholders. Since four of the five continuing stockholders
increased their proportionate interests in the corporation, the distributions to them would fail the substantially disproportionate test and most
likely would be found to be dividend equivalents. One continuing stockholder reduced his proportionate interest from 21 percent to ten percent
and he, along with those completely terminated, would have been entitled to sales treatment.
ns Notwithstanding the relative paucity of authority, the commentators have
generally assumed that the courts will not find an F reorganization when material
new investment is present. See, e.g., BITTKER. & EUSTICE, supra note 13, at Cj
14.54.3; Hjorth, supra note 85, at 759-60; Lane, supra note 100, at 1248-49.
119 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq., reviewed (3 dis.).
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If the transaction had been found to be a reorganization, comparable
tax consequences would have obtained. The old stockholders would
have been taxed only on the. cash boot distributed to them. As demonstrated earlier, the proper characterization of the boot would parallel the
characterization that would be imposed in a Zenz redemption and consistent results thus would be obtained with respect to these two forms of
functionally equivalent transactions. The effects of the transaction at the
corporate level would also parallel the consequences of a Zenz redemption. The tax attributes of the old corporation, including its earnings and
profits 120 and the basis for the assets remaining in corporate solution, 121
would be preserved, while the basis of assets acquired with the newly
contributed cash would equal the full value of those assets. Thus, in a
reorganization, the income tax consequences to each of the parties would
be appropriately tailored to the financial effect of the transaction upon
each of them. For that reason, the finding of a reorganization, where
appropriate, will normally produce superior tax results than will the
contrary finding.
By contrast, the failure of the court in Gallagher to find a reorganization produced quite different results. The continuing stockholder who
substantially reduced his interest recognized all gain inherent in his stockholdings, notwithstanding that a portion of that investment was not, in
substance, withdrawn from corporate solution. The remaining four stockholders also obtained capital gains taxation qespite their increased proportionate interests. Gallagher suggests that as long as the new investors
acquire more than 20 percent of the stock of the new company, sales
treatment is achieved even if all of the stockholders of the old corporation continue in the new corporation, their proportionate interests do
not change materially, and the net distribution retained by them is wholly
pro rata. 122

Prospects for a Judicial Solution
Although the early judicial construction of the F reorganization
seemed to establish a narrow and technical scope for the provision, it is
clear that the significance so extended to fresh investment was not only
wrong in principle but also produced wrong substantive results to the
parties to the transaction. There is some evidence in the more recent
cases in which the scope of the F reorganization has been considered that
1 20
121

I.R.C. § 381(c)(2).
I.R.C. § 362(b).
122 Indeed, the effect of the Gallagher approach on such a rcincorporation
would be to impose a moratorium upon dividend treatment not unlike the results
of applying Revenue Ruling 75-447 literally to a corporate expansion.
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the courts are beginning to recognize that the earlier approach was erroneous and that in the future fresh investment may be accorded a more
appropriate significance.
In several cases, beginning with Davant v. Commissioner, 123 the courts
have held that corporate distributions, even if resulting in material shifts
in proportionate ownership, did not destroy what would otherwise be an
F reorganization because the distributions were irrelevant to the characterization of the transaction. In Davant, the Fifth Circuit held that the
combination of two corporations under common control accompanied
by a distribution (found to be the equivalent of a dividend) of $900,000
constituted an F reorganization. With little hesitation, the court concluded that the mere distribution of unneeded cash did not alter the character of the transaction as a mere change in form within the meaning of
the reorganization provisions. Later that year, the same court, in Reef
Corp. v. Commissioner, 124 found a reincorporation was an F reorganization, notwithstanding that the holders of 48 percent of the stock of the
old corporation were completely redeemed as a part of the transaction.
The court reasoned that neither the reincorporation nor the redemption
effected a sufficient change in the character of the continuing investment
to deny reorganization treatment and that the combination of these two
corporate actions should not produce a different result. While the reasoning of the court in Reef is not compelling-the whole may, contrary to
the court's view, exceed the sum of its parts-the Fifth Circuit correctly
perceived that a shift in proportionate ownership was not relevant to the
characterization of a reincorporation.
Significantly, the court in Reef also observed that it might have reached
a different conclusion "if the change in proprietary interests were to new
persons and less than 50% of the former stockholders' interest in the old
corporation remained in the new corporation." 12 :~ The court appeared
to be suggesting that an F reorganization might properly be found in the
presence of any shift in proportionate ownership which does not violate
the continuity of interest doctrine.
This suggestion in Reef was subsequently repeated by the Second Circuit in a case posing similar facts. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
United States/ 26 the court examined a transaction designed to eliminate
minority stockholders who owned 38 percent of the stock of a subsidiary
corporation of the corporate taxpayer. The parent corporation formed a
1:!3 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). The
holdings in some of these cases have subsequently been limited by statutory amendment. See note 128 infra.
124 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
12:; Id. at 137.
126 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
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new shell subsidiary, merged the existing subsidiary into the shell, and
caused the issuance of parent company stock to the minority stockholders. The court concluded that the transaction was an F reorganization, notwithstanding what it characterized as the redemption of over 3 8
percent of the stock of the reorganized corporation. The court specifically stated that the redemption of a minority of the stockholders of a
corporation as part of a reincorporation transaction was not inconsistent
with F reorganization treatment.
The court noted that the prohibition against shifts in proprietary interest in connection with F reorganizations derived from a "broad dictum"
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp. 127 While Southwest had involved the virtual elimination of
the stockholders of the old corporation in an insolvency reorganization,
in the case at hand "there was merely a shift in the proprietary interest
of the minority stockholders." Having thus deprecated the restrictive
prior decisions, the Second Circuit noted its agreement with the Fifth
Circuit that while the traditional continuity of interest doctrine was applicable to the F reorganization, fresh investment not violating that rule
should not destroy an F reorganization.
While the full import of this line of decisions cannot now be known,
they demonstrate at the very least that the courts no longer regard themselves as bound by the narrow and inflexible construction of the F reorganization that influenced the decision in Gallagher. Moreover, these
two circuits have clearly held that corporate action which is undertaken
simultaneously with a reincorporation, but is not relevant to the characterization of that transaction, can be ignored in testing for the presence
of an F reorganization. While both cases involved shifts in interest attributable to corporate distributions, no reason appears for treating shifts
in ownership attributable to fresh investment differently. Indeed, language from the opinion in Reef, quoted by the Second Circuit, suggests
as much. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the congressional formulation of the definition of the F reorganization does not preclude the judicial construction of that provision consistently with the
general principles governing the finding of a reorganization. Under such
a construction, fresh investment not violating the continuity of interest
doctrine is irrelevant to the characterization of a liquidation-reincorporation.128
Id. at 823 n.15.
The application of the F reorganization to liquidation-reincorporation transactions has been somewhat limited by the addition in 1982 of the requirement that
the reorganization be "of one corporation." Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 255 (a), 96 Stat.
324 (1982). The amendment was intended to prohibit F reorganization treatment of a combination of two or more operating companies, such as occurred in
127

128

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1983]

FRESH

~VEST1iENT

473

Characterization of Distributions
If a liquidation-reincorporation is deemed a reorganization, the

amounts retained by the stockholders should be characterized under the
reorganization ru1es. That is, the net amount retained should be viewed
as a distribution by a continuing corporation to its stockholders in exchange for a portion of their stock in connection with a reorganization.
It wou1d appear that this amount shou1d thus be treated as boot in a reorganization, its character determined in the same manner as in other
boot distributions. Under the approach to boot characterization suggested above, the boot would be characterized under the same tests that
are applicable to the characterization of redemptions. Thus, the consequences to a participant in a liquidation-reincorporation would parallel
the consequences to a participant in a Zenz redemption.
In Revenue Ru1ing 61-156, however, the Commissioner appeared to
adopt a contrary view. The ruling held that a liquidation-reincorporation
was a reorganization. The retained assets, however, were not treated
as boot. Rather, they were characterized as though they had been distributed to the stockholders in a distribution separate from the reorganization. The ruling did not consider the possibility that such a separate
distribution might be a redemption taxable under section 302 but instead
asserted that the distribution was taxable as a dividend under section
301.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to address the still open question of whether distributions incident to an F reorganization constitute
boot taxable under section 356 or are to be taxed outside of the reorganization provisions. 1 !! 11 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this doubt,
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976), which
otherwise constitutes another form of reorganization but is categorized as an F
reroganization solely for the purpose of obtaining the more favorable limitations
on net operating loss carrybacks available under§ 381(b). See CoNF. REP. No.
760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 ( 1982). There was no suggestion that the amendment was designed to restrict the use of the F reorganization in attacking
liquidation-reincorporations, although such a restriction appears unavoidable.
Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967), for example, involved the combination of two operating companies
and presumably could not be regarded as an F reorganization under the amendment. Moreover, taxpayers may now be well advised to operate both the old and
the new corporation for a period of time before combining all operating assets in
the new corporation and dissolving the old. While the more transparent of such
schemes should not avoid F characterization, the Commissioner's technical problems in securing reorganization treatment for Iiquidation-reincorporation transactions plainly have been increased under the amendment
l29 Compare Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), with American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
204 (1970), reviewed (2 dis.).
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the effect of the fresh investment should be the same. In 1961, when the
ruling was issued, dividend treatment of the distributio~ may have appeared appropriate because the automatic dividend rule was then applied
to boot in reorganizations and it was entirely unclear whether the Zenz
integration doctrine was applicable to partial redemptions. Today, however, it is clear that whether a distribution is regarded as boot incident
to a reorganization or as a discretely taxable event, it is taxed as a sale
if, as in the ruling, it occurs as part of a transaction in which the proportionate ownership of the old stockholders in reduced from 100 percent to 45 percent.
If the distribution constitutes reorganization boot, it should be taxed
in the manner set forth in the earlier section of this article on boot. Conversely, if the distribution is regarded as separate from the reorganization
exchange, it nevertheless is a distribution in exchange for a portion of the
recipient's interest in the continuing corporation and should be tested for
dividend equivalence under the rules of section 302. There is no basis
whatsoever for avoiding the application of that section simply because
the redemption assumed the form of a distribution in complete liquidation. Indeed, even in Gallagher, the court construed the Commissioner's
argument in favor of taxation under section 301 as an assertion that the
distributions failed the tests of section 302 and for that reason were to be
taxed under section 301. 130 The more recent cases finding an F reorganization have assumed that distributions to minority stockholders whose
interests were terminated constituted redemptions taxable as sales. 131 If
distributions incident to an F reorganization can be redemptions taxable
as sales pursuant to the complete termination rule of section 302(b) (3),
no reason appears why a distribution cannot be similarly taxed under the
substantially disproportionate rule of section 302(b) (2). Indeed, the
notion that the consummation of an F reorganization should bar sale
treatment for a concurrent redemption, thereby producing a harsher tax
than would be imposed on distributions occurring in the absence of the
reorganization, is the nonsensical result obtained under the now discarded
automatic dividend rule. Since the dividend characterization contained
in the 1961 ruling is presumably derived from that rule, it too should now
be discarded. Accordingly, whether the distribution is taxable under
section 302 or under section 356, the tax consequences to the parties to
a liquidation-reincorporation can be made consistent with the conse1 30

39 T.C. at 155. See also Hertzog, supra note 101, at 945-47. The author
suggests that the government would have improved its chances of victory in
Gallagher and Berghash if it had conceded the application of § 302.
1 3 1 Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1018 (1967). See also Casco Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32
(1967), reviewed (5 dis.).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1983]

FRESH INVESTMENT

475

quences that would be obtained if they had chosen to structure their
transaction as a Zenz redemption. 132
Conclusion
The more favorable treatment that taxpayers have obtained in liquidation-reincorporations than in redemptions has been attributable to the
difficulty that the Service and the courts have experienced in attempting
to quantify the effect of fresh investment on the characterization of
formal reorganizations. Instead of directly addressing the relevance of
fresh investment to the finding of a reorganization, the Commissioner
sought victory by manipulating the definition of the relevant transaction
-the same unsatisfactory approach later adopted to obtain a favorable
characterization of boot. When his unpersuasive separate transaction
approach was rejected, the Commissioner lost his most effective weapon
against the Iiquidation-reincorporation device. That defeat, in turn, led
the Commissioner to press his attack through far less rational theories
which, had they succeeded, would have materially disrupted the coherence of subchapter C. 133
1 32 Complete consistency, however, would not be obtained. A Zenz redemption
can presumably occur, although the old stockholders emerge with stock having a
value far less than 50 percent of the value of the old corporation. II the transaction were structured as a liquidation-reincorporation, that radical a shift in
ownership would violate the continuity of interest test, thereby precluding reorganization treatment.
133 From as early as Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acq.,
reviewed (3 dis.), the Commissioner has argued that even if a Jiquidationreincorporation transaction did not amount to a reorganization, capital gains taxation should be denied because the transaction also was not a complete liquidation
within the meaning of § 331. That argument was accepted by the Tax Court in
Telephone Answering Serv. Co., v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), reviewed
(3 dis.), af]'d, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) CJ 77-786 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), and Casco Prods. Corp., 49 T.C. 32 (1967), reviewed (5 dis.). The court seemed relatively untroubled that its decisions in these
cases determined what tax consequences were not available to the parties but gave
not the slightest clue as to what tax consequences were available. The appellate
courts have not concurred in this approach. For example, in Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. United States, N. 128 supra, the Second Circuit disapproved the reasoning in Casco and stated that the transaction was an F reorganization. 568
F.2d at 822 n.13.
More recently, the Commissioner has argued that the formation of a new
corporation and the transfer of assets to it could be combined into a § 351 transaction. That argument has had little success in the courts. See, e.g., Stevens Pass,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 532 (1967). However, the Commissioner has
recently expanded this attack. Under Revenue Ruling 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141,
the transaction described in Revenue Ruling 61-156 might now be regarded as a
§ 351 exchange. Section 351, a nonrecognition provision closely related to the
reorganization sections, is a poor second choice as the vehicle for attacking the
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It is suggested here that the rules which emerge from a proper understanding of the relevance of fresh investment to the disposition of an
interest in a corporation lead to a result that is both correct and reasonable. And, of perhaps greater importance, the consistent application of
these rules yields consistent treatment for comparable but quite differently
structured transactions, thus furthering the rationality and coherence of
the Code.

Epilogue
Three types of transactions have been considered. While they are
structured quite differently, they have identical financial effects upon
the parties involved. Moreover, the transactions are frequently viewed
by taxpayers as alternative routes to a desired result and are chosen solely
for their income tax consequences. It should not have been terribly surprising to discover that under current law, each form of transaction is
taxed very differently from the others. While regrettable, such inconsistency of treatment is not uncommon under the Code. What should be
surprising, however, is that these inconsistent tax burdens are not required by the Code itself, but are attributable to inconsistent analysis of
the significance of fresh investment in the three contexts.
There is little basis for the hope that the bewildering complexity of the
tax laws will ever be materially diminished through a simplification of
the statutory detail. But the complexity, as well as the inappropriate tax
burden, produced by simple misapplication of Code provisions can and
must be reduced. It would be foolish to suggest that erroneous constructions of the tax laws can be entirely eliminated or that they derive from
a single identifiable cause. Courts will err and litigants on both sides will
assert extreme positions that at times will prevail. Indeed, the positions
criticized herein are in part attributable to a variety of causes ranging
from good faith human error to excessive adversarial zeal.
From the broadest perspective, however, the inconsistent analysis of
comparable transactions is often attributable to an excessively narrow
approach to the fashioning of rules of taxation. If rules are adopted by
liquidation-reincorporation. Not only does such a use stretch the scope of the
section beyond comprehensible limits, but § 351 lacks a dividend equivalence provision. Thus, even if the § 351 attack succeeds, all boot is entitled to capital gains
taxation and the resulting corporation thereby obtains an upwards basis adjustment for assets transferred to it. I.R.C. § 362(a). As a result, transactions brought
within § 351 will receive substantially different treatment from that imposed
upon transactions governed by the F reorganization, although the only difference
between the transactions is the amount of fresh investment obtained. As stated
repeatedly in the text, fresh investment properly docs not have such significance
to the taxation of the old stockholders.
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the Treasury, or by Congress and the courts, simply with a view to the
expedient resolution of immediate problems and with inadequate consideration of the consistency of the rules with other developed doctrines
within the taxing system, anomalies such as those addressed herein will
be unavoidable. Such myopia in the development of the taxing system
could well create a law of unmanageable complexity. It has been demonstated here that, in at least some contexts, the consistent application of
developed principles both is productive of a more rational taxing system
and is an entirely practical objective.
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